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Résumé   
Ce mémoire explore des façons de conceptualiser la responsabilité dans des 
cas où des individus contribuent de façon peu significative à des torts collectifs 
éloignés.  Pour contextualiser la discussion, la relation entre des actes de 
consommation et la perpétuation des « sweatshops » dans l’industrie des textiles et 
des chaussures est utilisée.  Une approche basée sur les droits humains est déployée 
pour définir le tort qui est présent dans les usines de textiles et une 
conceptualisation de la connection est proposée selon la notion de la structure 
sociale.  Guidé par la notion de « unstructured collective harms » proposée par 
Christopher Kutz, et en comparaison avec des notions de responsabilité qui mettent 
la responsabilité nationale en premier plan, les conclusions qui sont offertes ici sont 
centrées sur l’importance de la confrontation du consommateur pour remédier aux 
effets du problème d’action collective qui est au coeur de la création des torts 
collectifs lointains.  Finalement, l’importance du cosmopolitanisme comme une 
façon de stabiliser des théories de responsabilité à travers les frontières est mis en 
évidence.     
Mots clés:  Philosophie, responsabilité, responsabilité collective, 
cosmopolitanisme, sweatshops  
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Abstract 
This paper explores ways of conceptualizing responsibility in cases where 
individual agents contribute in marginal ways to a distant collective harm.  To 
contextualize the discussion, the relationship between consumer acts and the 
perpetuation of sweatshop labour in the Textiles, Clothing, and Footwear Industry 
has been focused upon.  A human rights framework is adopted to define the harm 
that occurs on sweatshop floors and an understanding of connection to the harm 
has been proposed using the concept of social structure.  Guided by the notion of 
unstructured collective harms, defined by Christopher Kutz, and in contrast to so 
called nation-centred approaches to responsibility,  the conclusions here centre on 
the need to confront individuals with their contributions to distant collective harms 
as a way of countering the collective action problem that leads to distant collective 
harms.  Finally, the importance of cosmopolitanism, as a way of stabilizing 
accounts of responsibility across borders, is emphasized.   
 
Key words:  Philosophy, responsibility, collective responsibility, cosmopolitanism, 
sweatshops 
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Introduction 
The process of economic globalization has been well documented and 
discussed at length by many writers, thinkers, politicians, and activists.  And while 
global trade has existed for hundreds of years, the past five decades have seen an 
unprecedented increase in the integration of domestic and regional economies into 
the global economic structure by virtue of new networks of communication, 
transportation, and trade.1  Trade barriers have fallen and new sources of labour 
and materials have been created worldwide, leading to a relocalisation of 
manufacturing centres and changes in the way that many consumer goods are 
produced.  International institutions like the IMF, World Bank, and GATT- WTO 
have been created with the mandate of managing the increase in international trade 
and the state has seen its role diminished from the unquestioned regulator of 
domestic economic policy to one of many actors negotiating the rules of business 
on its soil.2  The globalization of business has meant that shifts in employment, 
manufacturing, and consumption occur across a multitude of different countries 
rather than being restricted to one region or country.   
If the increase in connectedness between economic actors raises moral 
questions regarding the nature of these connections, the increased ability of 
individuals to affect distant others within shared global cooperative schemes has 
challenged conceptions of responsibility that would restrict the domain of 
individual responsibility to the nation-state.  How, then, should we conceptualize 
individual moral responsibility for marginal contributions to distant collective 
outcomes when these contributions are not performed with the intent to help or to 
                                                 
*The use of “his\her” in this paper is gender neutral. 
 
1 Jagdish Bhagwati, In Defense of Globalization (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), 3-7. 
   
2 For an interesting analysis of the concept of “overlapping sovereignties” in a globalized 
economy—or the negociation between international economic institutions and the State over 
domestic economic policy—see Shalini Randeria,  “The State of Globalization:  Legal Plurality, 
Overlapping Sovereignties and Ambiguous Alliances Between Civil Society and the Cunning State 
in India”, Theory, Culture and Society, 24 (2007): 1-33 
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harm?  The capacity for aggregated individual contributions to impact our 
environment and our social spheres is great.  Does this capacity dictate that we 
conceptualize individual moral responsibility in different ways, thereby extending 
the sphere of individual moral concern to encompass marginal contributions to 
distant outcomes?   
The responses that I will provide to these questions will be contextualized 
by a study of consumer responsibility for harms that occur in sweatshops that 
produce goods in the Textiles, Clothing, and Footwear (TCF) industry, and this 
against the backdrop of a world dominated by nation-states.  What I will propose is 
that the best way to account for these types of collective harms, i.e., where 
individuals contribute in marginal ways to harms that occur in other nations, is by 
challenging a nation-centred approach to responsibility with a moral cosmopolitan 
account of justice that can stabilize theories of responsibility across borders while 
simultaneously recuperating the role of the state as an essential aid in the 
realization of responsibility on the individual level.  This directs us towards the 
conclusion that, if we hope to include consumers in accounts of responsibility for 
distant economic harms, then it will be necessary to develop an understanding of a 
global community that is underwritten by a basic cosmopolitan conception of 
morality while involving the state in solutions that enable consumers to exercise 
their individual moral reasoning in ways that can promote more positive collective 
outcomes. 
While I maintain a focus on consumer responsibility for harm in TCF 
sweatshops as a way of contextualizing this work,  my goal is not to question the 
essential justice of globalization.  Rather I hope to explore ways to engage a sense 
of consumer responsibility for distant harms in order to develop a framework that 
effectively harnesses and directs individual marginal contributions towards more 
positive outcomes within shared global cooperative schemes.  In terms of 
sweatshops, effectively engaging consumer responsibility for sweatshop labour can 
be another arrow in the quiver of those concerned with improving working 
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conditions worldwide in the TCF industry without countering the overall economic 
benefits that globalization has brought about.  More generally, the framework that I 
develop here could also apply to similar types of collective harms in environmental 
and social domains.   
 The structure of the paper is the following.  In chapter one, I will contrast a 
nation-centred account of responsibility with what Christopher Kutz defines as 
unstructured collective harms.  Kutz’ account of this type of harm provides a 
plausible conceptual explanation for the role that consumers play in the 
perpetuation of sweatshop labour and clearly challenges the resources of nation-
centred approaches to responsibility.  I will also use Kutz`s account to provide 
guidelines for generating solutions to this type of harm.  In chapter two,  I will 
begin to build an account of consumer responsibility by conceptualizing the harm 
of sweatshop labour according to a human rights model proposed by Joel Feinberg.  
Chapter three continues in this vein by proposing ways that consumers can 
conceptualize their connection to distant sweatshop workers and deepen their 
understanding of their participation in collective ventures, both in terms of their 
role as economic actors and according to the concept of social structure.  Chapter 
four seeks to define consumer responsibility and the role that nation-states play in 
the realization of this responsibility on an individual level.  Chapter four will 
address the importance of confrontation in the creation of stable and coherent 
moments where consumers can effectively bring their individual moral reasoning 
to bear on the problem of sweatshop labour, thus increasing the potential that 
individual consumer acts will be directed toward more positive collective 
outcomes.  
Before beginning, I will address some methodological concerns.  First, 
human rights are a fundamental concept in the model that I will present here, both 
in the definition of harm and the conceptualization of responsibility.  I have chosen 
to use a human rights framework in this work for pragmatic reasons.  Human rights 
represents a moral standard that is widely recognized and accepted: nearly every 
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country in the world has ratified a rights-based treaty in some form and a large 
majority of countries have adopted labour standards that utilize rights-based 
language.3  The broad acceptance of human rights internationally has implications 
for the institution of the state-regulated solutions that I will propose later on.  The 
confluence of human rights models with current trends in international law 
strengthens this methodological choice.    Furthermore, my focus in this paper is to 
develop a coherent model of responsibility for the relatively well-resourced global 
consumer whose collective consumer purchasing power represents a significant 
portion of the world’s purchasing power.  I assume that the well-resourced 
consumer in question sympathizes with human rights as an acceptable moral 
concept.  The use of human rights can be criticized as being culturally derived and 
therefore problematic from the point of view of those who experience harm in 
sweatshops but do not acknowlege human rights in a morally significant way.  In 
this way, the model that I will develop contains a distinct western, liberal bias.   
This could lead to the theorization of harm into existence according to a set of 
moral criteria that does not resonate with the actual sufferers of the supposed harm.  
While this is problematic, I believe that the broad consensus on human rights in the 
international community goes a long way to countering this effect within the 
context of the argument developed here.   
There are three senses of responsibility that are of particular importance in this 
work: role-responsibility, legal responsibility, and moral responsibility.  The sense 
of role-responsibility has been defined by H.L.A Hart as a “`sphere of 
responsibility` requiring care and attention over a protracted period of time.”4  It is 
assigned to an individual occupying an office or role in society and a failure to 
                                                 
3 Jody Heymann and Alison Earle,  Raising the Global Floor: Dismantling the Myth That We Can’t 
Afford Good Working Conditions For Everyone (Stanford:  Stanford University Press, 2010), 101-
114; the “ILO Declaration on Social Justice for a Fair Globalization”, The International Labour 
Organization, accessed August 2, 2010, http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---dgreports/---
cabinet/documents/publication/wcms_099766.pdf , 6-7.   
4 H.L.A Hart,  Punishment and Responsibility (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1968), 213 
5 
 
effectively address those objects in the sphere of responsibility can leave one open 
to blame.  Leif Wenar uses a sense of role-responsibility similar to Hart, writing 
that “If you are responsible for something, then [...] it is up to you to take care of it. 
If you do take care of it, you have discharged your responsibility. If you do not, 
you may be subject to blame or punishment.”5  Wenar applies role-responsibility, 
coupled with a “least cost” rule of rectification, to the question of institutional 
responsibility for severe poverty in the world.  I will consider applying the notion 
of role-responsibility particularly at the national level.  For example, we might say 
that part of the role-responsibility of the state is to protect the rights of its citizens.     
 
I will rely mainly on a moral understanding of responsibility that is important to 
distinguish from legal responsibility.  Some of the same criteria used for imputing 
legal responsibility to an individual or a collective will be used in the models of 
moral responsibility that I will discuss.  These criteria include causal connection to 
the harm, certain epistemic conditions such as knowledge of the consequences of 
one’s action, and blameworthy action.  However, the two senses of responsibility 
remain very different.  Legal responsibility is subject to change depending on legal 
jurisdictions or whether particular laws are written or repealed.   In contrast, using 
a definition of moral responsibility in this work involves seeking a sense of 
responsibility that is not subject to the same “arbitrariness and policy-dependence”6 
to which legal responsibility is subject.   
 
Grappling with moral responsibility is a way of seeking a conceptual account of 
responsibility that is more stable, fundamental, and general than its legal 
counterpart.  However, as Joel Feinberg points out, formulating rules for moral 
responsibility can draw us into the inner world of individuals where conceptual 
accounts of moral rules may not readily apply and attempts to escape the relativity 
                                                 
5 Leif Wenar,  “Responsibility and Severe Poverty” in Freedom from Poverty as a Human Right, ed. 
Thomas Pogge (Oxford: UNESCO and Oxford University Press 2007), 2. 
6 Joel Feinberg, Doing and Deserving (Princeton: Princeton University Press1970), 34. 
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of law may confront us with the arbitrariness of luck.7  I cannot hope to develop a 
comprehensive moral doctrine here that could effectively respond to the drawbacks 
of moral responsibility that Feinberg brings up.  Rather, my project involves the 
recognition that legal systems are incapable of fully accounting for the harms that I 
am concerned with because the diversity of legal jurisdictions that come to bear on 
the actors involved in perpetuating sweatshop labour causes a diffusion of 
responsibility and a lack of accountability.  Law plays an important role in solving 
collective problems but law has limitations when multiple jurisdictions are 
involved, which is why I believe a conception of moral responsibility may be more 
appropriate for addressing the problem at hand.   
 
To reconcile the tension between legal and moral responsibility, without having 
to rely on a single comprehensive moral system, I will work with a set of moral 
concepts—in this case human rights—that resonate with individuals in a variety of 
different contexts, that resonate with current trends in global law, and that contain 
conceptual tools that might enable individuals to coherently account for moral 
responsibility across borders.  The interplay of moral and legal senses of 
responsibility, conjoined with the role of the state in defining and protecting 
individual rights, will be an important component of this paper. 
 
The sense of moral responsibility that I will focus on here has parallels with 
legal models of responsibility and is, generally, a stable and coherent component of 
individual moral reasoning.  Moral responsibility in this context is based upon a 
backward-looking accountability that requires the fulfillment of certain criteria in 
order to be fully realized.  For instance, to be morally responsible for a harmful 
outcome, causal factors must link an agent to the creation of the harm.  
Furthermore, epistemic conditions must have been fulfilled such that it can be 
shown that the agent was clearly confronted with a morally significant choice and 
that the agent could apprehend the consequences of the options available to her.  
                                                 
7 Ibid., 37. 
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Finally, the agent, conscious of the moral import of his choices, must have 
nevertheless freely chosen to conduct himself in a way that causes the morally 
significant outcome.  When these conditions hold, the agent can be held 
responsible for the harm in ways that are, supposedly, proportional to his 
contribution.  Accountability in this sense means being open to imputations of 
blame or faultiness and being required to make redress or to change behaviour in 
order to avoid similar contributions to harm in the future.  I will use the term 
“moral responsibility” rather than “moral accountability” in this paper.  If I use the 
term “consumer responsibility” or simply “responsibility” it will be in the “moral 
responsibility” sense described above.  Use of the role-responsibility sense will be 
clearly identified throughout the paper as will any reference to legal responsibility. 
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Chapter 1 – The Nation-State, Unstructured Collective Harms, and 
Sweatshops 
 
Conceptualizing consumer responsibility for sweatshop harm is a difficult 
endeavour because typical models of individual responsibility are at odds with the 
collective features of the harm.  Furthermore, adequately engaging individuals in 
solutions requires the recuperation of individual models of responsibility in stable 
and coherent ways, despite this dissonance.  In order to proceed with the project 
laid out in this paper, I will address some of the main stumbling blocks that prevent 
an adequate conceptualization of consumer responsibility, beginning with the 
restriction of moral responsibility to the nation-state.  I will contrast a general 
nation-centred account of responsibility with the main features of unstructured 
collective harms in order to show the need for extending the moral sphere of 
individuals beyond borders.  Consequently, the limits of a purely nation-centred 
approach to responsibility will be exposed.  Finally, I will also show how consumer 
responsibility for sweatshop labour can be adequately conceptualized in terms of 
unstructured collective harms. 
Nation-Centred Accounts of Responsibility 
Who is responsible for the protection of individual moral rights?  In a world 
dominated by the nation-state, it is the nation-state itself that is often invoked as the 
most important guarantor of individual moral rights.  In turn, borders are often 
invoked as the most relevent boundary of responsibility.  From this perspective, 
individual actions are contained and regulated by the actions of the state and 
collective harms are most adequately addressed with reference to national 
membership.  Before exploring the limitations of this perspective, I would like to 
clarify how a general nation-centred approach to responsibility operates. 
  Joel Feinberg provides a liberal account of the moral relationship between 
the individual and the state in Harm to Others.  Feinberg suggests that the moral 
sense of rights relates to those rights claims we have against others to refrain from 
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harming us in some way and that these rights claims often entail a corresponding 
enforcement right against the state to provide a means to protect the moral rights of 
its citizens.8  Furthermore, moral and enforcement rights claims will often overlap 
with legal rights within a society.  For example, if I have a moral right not to be 
murdered then I can also identify a corresponding enforcement right against the 
state that requires the state to put measures into place to prevent me from being 
murdered.  In this case, the moral right to not be murdered will most likely be 
codified into a similar legal right guaranteed by the state.  Effective state 
intervention, then, can be key in the fulfilment of individual moral rights.  
Furthermore, we can understand the responsibility of the state to protect the moral 
rights of its citizens in terms of role-responsibility.  The state has the role-
responsibility to respect the enforcement claims of its citizens, or in other words, 
the “sphere of responsibility” of the state extends to include the protection of the 
moral rights of its citizens.  How the state attends to its role-responsibility is not 
specified.  We can assume that the state must attend to this role-responsibility in 
some way and hold it accountable when it fails.  To continue in this vein, with 
regards to neighbouring states, the jurisdiction of one state delineates its “sphere of 
responsibility” against the “sphere of responsibility” of other nation-states.  
Individual moral rights, as a universal and general concept, are nevertheless 
protected through devolved national action.  The international community, 
operating on a model of nation-centred responsibility, must grapple with difficult 
questions of accountability when a state fails in its role-responsibility to protect the 
individual moral rights of its citizens.  
With regards to the actions of individuals, responsibility for harm is best 
located within the state on the nation-centred approach.  Individual contributors to 
distant harm can limit their understanding of personal responsibility to their 
national borders.   In a framework where the moral rights of individuals are 
guaranteed by virtue of enforcement claims on the state, it is the responsibility of 
                                                 
8 Joel Feinberg, Harm to Others.  (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1984), 110. 
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the state institutions where the harm takes place to manage damage to individuals, 
despite distant contributions.  On this account, if harm occurs it is often due to a 
breakdown in the institutional structure of the state and it is remedied by 
strengthening those same structures.  For instance, John Rawls, in The Law of 
Peoples, develops a nation-centred account of responsibility that captures this 
focus on the quality of domestic institutional structure.9  Rawls extends many of 
the features of justice as fairness to the international domain in an attempt to define 
the basic laws that would govern a society of peoples in a world beset with 
diversity.  The Law of Peoples argues for a theoretical structure that would enable 
the achievement of a realistic utopia over time.  In Rawls’s vision, a continuous 
process of domestic institutional development in line with the liberal democratic 
model of justice and a coherent set of international rules for managing conflict 
would allow inter-societal relations to progressively improve and stabilize.  
However, whereas Rawls uses an individual normative approach in his accounts of 
domestic justice, in the Law of Peoples he insists on the necessity of the state 
system and uses “peoples”—which he believes capture moral motives such as 
mutual respect and reciprocity—as his most fundamental unity of analysis.  He 
begins with considerations of ideal theory where he employs a contractualist 
method, including two separate rounds of the original position involving liberal 
societies and then decent hierarchical societies, to generate a set of eight laws that 
he believes would be the subject of consensus amongst well-ordered peoples and 
that could form the basis of an adequate Law of Peoples.  In the third part of his 
book, Rawls considers questions of non-ideal theory relating to burdened societies, 
outlaw states, and benevolent absolutisms.  This third part encompasses issues like 
just war principles and a duty to aid societies in need.  The Rawlsian approach in 
the Law of Peoples captures the notion that responsibility for the rectification of 
harms should fall within national borders.  While distant others may affect each 
other in significant ways and collective acts may have considerable impact,  Rawls 
nevertheless emphasizes state institutional structure as the most important 
                                                 
9 John Rawls,  The Law of Peoples (Cambridge:  Harvard University Press 1999), 105-112. 
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ingredient in the development of a just society.  The moral relationship between the 
individual and the state in liberal societies acts as the normative model for the best 
organization of a society and as the means of working out an adequate institutional 
structure for the prevention and rectification of harm.  In this way, responsibility 
for improving domestic institutional structure falls primarily on the concerned 
nation, with outside nation-states mainly providing assistance to burdened societies 
that is aimed at helping the burdened society in its efforts to improve its 
institutional structure.  
Another formulation of the Rawlsian position is the Institutional Thesis 
defended by Mathias Risse.  Risse based the Institutions Thesis on the work of 
Rawls and a number of other thinkers including Douglass North and David Lands.  
The Thesis can be summarized in the following way. 
Growth and prosperity depend on the quality of institutions, such as stable 
property rights, rule of law, bureaucratic capacity, appropriate regulatory 
structures to curtail at least the worst forms of fraud, anti-competitive 
behaviour, and graft, quality and independence of courts, but also 
cohesiveness of society, existence of trust and social cooperation, and thus 
overall quality of civil society.10  
 
Risse employs the Institutional Thesis alongside Feinberg’s model of harm 
in Harm to Others in his article  “How Does the Global Order Harm the Poor” to 
argue that the global order, specifically as it is characterized by Thomas Pogge, 
does not harm the global poor because the global order does not set back the 
interests of the global poor in a measurable way nor does the global order wrong 
them in a rights-based sense.  In essence, Risse maintains that the quality of 
domestic institutions is the most important factor in the wealth and well-being of a 
nation, not the effects of the global order.  The Institutional Thesis, then, refers to 
the position already laid out by Rawls in the Law of People that the quality of 
                                                 
10 Mathias Risse,  “How Does the Global Harm the Poor?” Philosophy and Public Affairs 33 
(2005): 355.  See note 7 on the same page for a list of authors that were consulted in the 
development of the Institutional Thesis.  Risse originally developed the Thesis in  “What We Owe 
to the Global Poor”, Journal of Ethics 9 (2005): 81-117.  
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domestic institutions plays the most important role in assuring justice and security 
in the domestic sphere and for the creation (or lack) of wealth for peoples within 
national boundaries.  Like Rawls, Risse emphasizes the role-responsibility of the 
state for the rectification of harms within its jurisdiction.   If national institutions 
are strong, it is possible to regulate and respond to harms.  As national institutional 
structures weaken, harms are left unregulated and they perpetuate and worsen.  If 
national institutions were never strong in the first place, then many harms occur 
that require remedying.  The remedy comes in the form of a strengthening of these 
same institutions.  This position becomes problematic when it is applied to the 
rectification of harms that are defined in terms of individual moral rights but where 
the violators of the rights are distant others.  In cases like this, the violators are not 
within the jurisdiction of the state yet the affected state is still role-responsible for 
rectifying the harm.  In other words, distant contributors are absolved of individual 
responsibility for the harms to which they may contribute while states are left to 
rectify a problem that may be beyond their control.  The concept of unstructured 
collective harm is particularly problematic for nation-centred approaches in this 
way. 
Unstructured Collective Harms 
In his book Complicity: Ethics and Law for a Collective Age, Christopher 
Kutz calls “unstructured collective harms” a type of harm that results from the 
unorganized collective acts of individuals who inhabit the same system.11  The 
features that Kutz lays out for this type of harm and his criteria for an adequate 
solution will help to guide the discussion in this paper.  I will describe the main 
features of this type of harm before discussing ways that Kutz theorizes solutions.   
 For Kutz, unstructured collective harms arise from the confluence of 
individual actions that are connected together within the same system.  The 
individual contributors within the system rarely act with the intention to cause 
                                                 
11  Christopher Kutz, Complicity: Ethics and Law for a Collective Age (Cambridge: New York, 
Cambridge University Press 2001), 166-203.   
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harm.  However, the aggregation of individual non-intentional acts results in a 
harmful outcome elsewhere in the system, often distant from the contributors.  
Furthermore, each individual contributes in marginal ways to the ultimate harm 
that results, thus undermining accounts of responsibility on the individual level.  
Kutz uses an environmental example—the pollution caused by the use of freon-
based air conditioners in cars—to illustrate.  In the example, individual car owners 
engage in the morally neutral act of driving their car and using their air 
conditioning system.  Each driver inhabits the same system, in this case the 
environment writ large, and it is the features of the environment that connect the 
actions of air conditioner users to the individuals who suffer the results of air 
conditioner use.  Environmental mechanisms, such as the atmosphere that receives 
the freon, the biochemical reactions that lead to a breakdown in the ozone layer, 
wind and other factors cause the effects of the released freon to be felt by others in 
particular corners of the world, often far from the site of freon use.  In this way, the 
environmental system mediates the unstructured collective harm by interacting 
with individual actions to produce a harm that was individually unintended.  
Within this system, none of the drivers intends to cause environmental harm in a 
direct sense nor can an individual make a significant difference on his own because 
each contribution is marginal.  One driver who ceases to use his air conditioner 
cannot prevent the collective harm from occurring nor can one individual who uses 
an air conditioner create the harm in the first place.  No single person can be said to 
have intentionally acted in an inexcusable manner such that a hole in the ozone 
layer resulted.  Rather,  it is the collective use of air conditioners that leads to the 
creation and perpetuation of the harm.   
The marginal contributions, and the diffuse causality of the harm, makes 
the establishment of accountability difficult.  As Kutz points out, there is “no 
outcome that can be identified with the agent’s will”12 either individually or 
collectively.  While no individual can be found faulty, the aggregate of “drivers 
                                                 
12 Ibid., 169. 
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who use air conditioners” does not possess the traits of agency required to impute 
collective responsibility for the environmental harm, even though the damage 
caused by the aggregate of marginal individual contributions exists and can often 
be significant.  The collective in question—the aggregate of individual 
contributors—is unstructured in the sense that it does not possess a clear decision-
making process with which to organize itself and with which we can properly 
impute it with agential qualities.13  In order to hold all drivers who use air 
conditioners responsible as a whole, some level of group organization is required.  
The lack of group-agency precludes what Kutz refers to as “holistic” solutions.  
Instead, it requires an exploration of ways to effectively engage individuals in 
collective endeavours to counter the harms. 
 Kutz uses game theory to show how collective action problems arise in 
cases of unstructured collective harms.  In a system where compliance means 
avoiding the act that contributes to harm and defection means performing an act 
that contributes to harm, Kutz demonstrates how individuals are likely to defect 
when they pursue rational choices in cases where there is little assurance that others 
will comply.  In other words, when a driver has little assurance that other drivers 
will cease using their air conditioners as a way of preventing collective 
environmental harm, then he will be unlikely to cease himself.  To stabilize these 
types of collective action problems, Kutz explores the use of what Amartya Sen 
calls “Assurance Games”  where political tools are used—in the form of incentives 
or sanctions—to provide greater assurance to the participants that universal 
compliance is likely to occur.  However, Kutz points out that Assurance Game 
schemes are not sufficient on their own to ensure compliance and are often very 
expensive.  He suggests that political solutions should be bolstered with a moral 
dimension whereby individuals adopt a conception of harm that includes “deeper, 
                                                 
13 For a discussion of the ways that collectives can be considered group-agents that are capable of 
bearing collective responsibility as a whole, see Peter French “The Corporation as a Moral Person”, 
American Philosophical Quarterly, 16 (1979): 207-215; Philip Pettit, ''Responsibility Incorporated'' 
Ethics,117 (2007) 171-201 ; and J. Angelo Corlett, “Collective Moral Responsibility,” Journal of 
Social Philosophy, 32 (2001): 573-584.    
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systemic forms of collective action”14 such as a culture or a way of life and 
character-based motives for action.  The attention to systemic connections to the 
harm and character-based considerations leads participants to attach moral disvalue 
to defection.  The added “moral cost” of defection increases the overall cost of 
defection and, coupled with Assurance Schemes, helps to motivate individuals to 
comply.  In this way, Kutz focuses on solutions that are psychologically stable and 
that have resources to help enlarge an individual’s view of collective harms.  By 
exploiting some of the same mechanisms that cause unstructured collective 
harms—such as the aggregation of individual efforts—Kutz suggests that we can 
engage individuals in a collective venture that leads to more positive outcomes.  
For instance, individuals can pose symbolic actions such that they feel that they are 
being consistent with a positive, individual character-based view of morality that 
includes the notion of not participating in the perpetuation of the unstructured 
collective harm.  
Consumer acts in the TCF industry demonstrate many of the characteristics 
of unstructured collective harms.  First, consumers in the TCF industry represent an 
unorganized collective that is spread out over many different countries.  
Consumers, as a whole, do not possess a decision-making system that they can 
utilize to direct their collective power in conscious ways.  Rather, collective power 
operates as a function of the aggregation of individual consumer choices.   Second, 
consumers contribute to the plight of workers in marginal ways by virtue of the act 
of purchasing products produced in sweatshops. These purchases, when 
aggregated, direct production in particular ways.  Consumer demand stimulates the 
production of goods.  Competition drives down the price of goods.  Consumer 
response to low prices helps to increase competitiveness in an already competitive 
industry, thus contributing to the perpetuation of sweatshops that offer the cheapest 
labour costs.  Third, the economic actors that are involved in TCF exchanges 
inhabit the same system of economic cooperation.  This means that collective 
                                                 
14 Kutz, Complicity, 167. 
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action, whether consciously pursued or not, can have significant effects on other 
actors within the system by virtue of mediating factors.  Finally, when we consider 
how a consumer might conceptualize his responsibility for sweatshops based on a 
typical model of individual responsibility, the application of the concept of 
unstructured collective harms seems to apply even more appropriately.  It is part of 
the nature of unstructured collective harms that individual conceptions of 
responsibility are undermined by the diffuse causality and multiple layers of 
accountability that characterize international systems of cooperation.   
Theorizing consumer responsibility for sweatshop labour involves a tension 
between individual conceptions of consumer responsibility, the empirical effects of 
international systems of cooperation, and the need to work within the boundaries of 
individual moral reasoning in order to generate solutions.  To elaborate on why this 
is the case, consider the following model of individual responsibility proposed by 
Philip Pettit in Responsibility Incorporated.  Pettit’s model is useful because it 
includes some basic, and feasible, criteria for understanding responsibility in both 
moral and legal senses without relying on overtly legal language.     
Value relevance.—He or she is an autonomous agent and faces a value 
relevant choice involving the possibility of doing something good or bad or 
right or wrong. 
 
Value judgment.—The agent has the understanding and access to evidence 
required for being able to make judgments about the relative value of such 
options. 
 
Value sensitivity.—The person has the control necessary for being able to 
choose between options on the basis of judgments about their value.15 
Let us assume that each of the preceding three criteria must be fulfilled for an 
individual’s sense of responsibility to be fully engaged and for imputations of 
responsibility to be relevent.  In Pettit’s model, it is assumed that the agent is 
confronted with a morally relevant choice that puts him on a path where he must 
                                                 
15 Philip Pettit, ''Responsibility Incorporated'', Ethics,117 (2007): 175, emphasis authors. 
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either choose to perform an act that will cause harm or choose to perform an act 
that will not cause harm and therefore the agent has the capacity to affect the 
outcome one way or another.  If the agent is capable of being confronted with 
morally relevant choices, including the contribution or non-contribution to a harm, 
and if the agent can understand the consequences of the choices that he is 
confronted with and he has the control necessary to choose one way or another, 
then we can properly say that the agent is responsible for his choice and the 
outcome that results. 
 
Unfortunately, the interaction between consumers and TCF workers distorts 
this model and weakens arguments for consumer responsibility.  For instance, to 
fulfil the value-relevance criteria, the “autonomous agent”—autonomous in the 
sense of possessing free will—must be faced with a choice that is of legitimate 
moral import where the agent can either pursue a good or a bad course of action.  
From the consumer perspective in the TCF industry, value-relevance is 
undermined because the choices that consumers are faced with are often benign in 
character.  Individual purchases of shoes or clothing do not typically carry moral 
weight for consumers and therefore these consumer acts are not often considered to 
be moral choices as such.  In terms of value-judgment, the agent must be capable of 
understanding the consequences of the different choices that might be made and 
also have access to the information required to make an informed choice.  These 
epistemic criteria are crucial for imputing responsibility.  If the agent is either 
incapable of understanding the importance of the choices available or lacks 
information to discern the consequences of one choice over another, responsibility 
is forfeited.  Consumer value-judgement is undermined because individual 
consumers cannot coherently grasp the effect that they have on distant others due to 
the diffusion of causality and the unclear connections between consumer goods and 
the harm itself.  Some research by individual consumers can shore this gap, but it 
remains difficult to know with certainty that we are causing harm, and in turn,  it 
becomes easy to disregard the information that we have acquired.  Finally, value-
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sensitivity, the ability of the agent to realize one choice or another based on the 
understanding they possess of its moral consequences, is undermined most notably 
because of the lack of knowledge regarding the harm but also for very practical 
reasons.  Some consumers are constrained by a lack of choice.  They may have 
every intention or desire to make ethical purchases but a lack of more ethical 
options or a lack of purchasing power to afford more ethical options undermines 
the intention.    
However, the ways that individual moral responsibility are undermined does 
not prevent the conceptualization of consumer responsibility in the TCF industry.  
Rather, the points at which individual conceptions of responsibility are undermined 
highlights areas that need to be adequately addressed by theory.  For instance, 
conceptualizing in a coherent way the harm of sweatshop labour and the 
connection that consumers have to the harm is a first step toward strengthening the 
applicability of the criteria in Pettit’s model and therefore engaging individual 
conceptions of responsibility.  The next step is to propose ways that these coherent 
theorizations can be brought to bear on individual moral reasoning in a reasonable 
manner and such that more positive acts are facilitated.   
 
Let us recall for a moment the nation-centred approach to responsibility and its 
tension with the phenomenon of unstructured collective harms.  Role-responsibility 
for sweatshops rests upon the shoulders of the nation where the sweatshops are 
housed but the creation and perpetuation of sweatshops are not due solely to 
domestic factors: many actors—including consumers—contribute to the processes 
that bring about harm on sweatshop floors.  What is unique about contemporary 
sweatshops is their subscription within extensive international networks of 
economic cooperation.  Tension arises, then, between the subscription of 
responsibility to the national institutions of the affected state and the contributions 
to the harm by actors that are not accountable to these institutions and/or are 
operating beyond the national boundaries of the country that houses the sweatshop.   
This state of affairs seems to necessitate a theory of responsibility that takes the 
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international sphere into account and that allows for all contributors to the harm to 
be addressed, even if those contributors are individuals contributing in marginal 
ways.  And the form that the extended responsibility takes is critical.  Many 
practical reasons can be invoked in support of the limitation of personal 
responsibility to the boundaries of their respective state.  After all, being held 
responsible for the effects of all of our actions, even those effects that we did not 
intend, would be very demanding.  An individual could never fully discharge his 
responsibilities within such a demanding system.  However, the extension of 
individual responsibility can be proportional to the abilities of the individual to act.  
In this way, the relegation of responsibility for sweatshops to the affected nation-
state is not a theoretical necessity but rather a consequence of the inexistence of 
adequate moments where individuals can exercise their moral reasoning, in stable 
and coherent ways, and then consciously direct their individual contributions 
towards collective solutions, rather than collective harms.   Consequently, the state 
institutions of contributors can be utilized to realize consumer responsibility in 
such a way as to engage consumers in collective solutions. 
 
To be effective, collective solutions must operate coherently on the 
individual level, be morally relevant, and feasible.  First, individual consumers 
must reproach themselves for contributing to unstructured collective harms and 
identify affirmatively with efforts to prevent them.  Second, individuals, in their 
role as consumers, must understand themselves as contributors to harms that occur 
beyond their national boundaries by virtue of international systems of economic 
cooperation.  These contributions, in turn, must be considered to be morally 
relevant.  Finally, consumers must have access to tools that enable them to bring 
their moral reasoning to bear on the moral dimensions of their purchases in a 
structured, clear, and feasible moment. Inspired in part by the work of Kutz, I thus 
outline three standards for the development of an effective solution—psychological 
feasibility, social connection across borders, and political tools of “confrontation." 
These tools, while allowing for consumer autonomy, should also contain some 
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elements of an Assurance Scheme whereby the impression that other consumers 
will make ethical purchases is increased, thus increasing the likelihood that any 
individual consumer will make an ethical purchase.  I will suggest that the state, 
using tools of confrontation, is best suited to this task.    
 
a) Psychological Feasibility  
 
Kutz emphasizes the importance of developing solutions that are stable and 
coherent to individuals upon reflection.  Individual motivations to solve 
unstructured collective harms 
 
must be psychologically feasible, which is to say that they must be 
internalizable and stable under reflection.  In other words, the theoretical, 
individualistic challenge places constraints upon practical, systemic 
solutions.  Feasible motivations must be grounded in structures of moral 
reasoning, namely conceptions of wrongdoing and accountability.16    
 
The constraint of psychological feasibility arises because of the non-agential 
qualities of the collective involved in creating the harm.  In unstructured collective 
harms, responsibility is divested most effectively to the individual level because we 
cannot hold the collective responsible as a whole and the harm erupts from 
individual, non-intentional contributions.  The approach that is developed in this 
paper must operate coherently on the individual level.  Applying a theoretical 
structure that retains many of the features of an individual model of responsibility, 
including notions of faultiness and backward-looking accountability, are key 
because these ways of apprehending contributions to harm are coherent within 
individual conceptions of moral reasoning and they are effective for motivating 
individual action.  In line with this criterion, I have chosen to use a human rights 
framework extensively in this paper for reasons which I addressed in the 
introduction of this paper. 
                                                 
16 Kutz, Complicity, 177. 
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b) Social Connection Across National Boundaries 
 
Adequately theorizing the connections that we have across national boundaries  
is a crucial component of the framework that I will propose here.  The popular 
position that limits moral responsibility to shared national institutional networks 
represents an obstacle to the resolution of unstructured collective harms.  
Accounting for how we are connected with others in significant ways despite a lack 
of shared national institutions is essential for individuals to grasp how their actions 
in one context may significantly contribute to the life conditions of others, 
elsewhere.  I will theorize ways that individuals can understand their connection to 
these harms in a meaningful way, focusing mainly on the concept of social 
structure.    
 
c) Political Tools that Enable “Confrontation” 
 
The use of political tools to aid in assurance of universal compliance is an 
important point that Kutz explicates.  My approach here is not only to focus on 
ways to increase compliance but also on the need to confront individual 
contributors with the harm to which they are linked and to provide more clearly 
defined moments where individuals can bring their moral reasoning to bear on the 
choices they make.  Political tools that involve confronting individuals with their 
participation in unstructured collective harms represent a way of increasing a sense 
of universal compliance—because individuals know that others are confronted in 
similar ways—but it also provides a means of bringing moral import to individual 
decisions that would otherwise go unconsidered.   Later in this paper, I will explore 
possible practical recommendations for tools that involve confrontation, and that 
are regulated by the state. These standards will form the basis of my approach to 
unstructured collective harms in the TCF industry.  I will now turn my attention to 
a conceptualization of harm.  
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Chapter 2 – Conceptualizing the Harm 
To account for consumer responsibility, it is crucial to define the harm itself 
in terms that resonate with the conceptions of morality of most relatively well-
resourced consumers.  A conceptualization of harm on sweatshop floors must be 
clear, stable, and coherent if consumers are to accept that they have a responsibility 
for the state of affairs.  I will return to the the work of Joel Feinberg in Harm to 
Others to address this issue.   
Harm 
Feinberg distinguishes three senses of harm.  The first sense is what he calls 
a derivative sense whereby anything that is “shattered”, “ruptured”, “burned”, or in 
any way “damaged” in a manner that is contrary to the interests of its possessor can 
be considered harmed.  It is derivative because the harm visited upon the object is 
interpreted in relation to the interests of the possessor and not solely in relation to 
the well-being of the object itself.  Feinberg dismisses this first sense of harm 
because of its derivative character and focuses instead on the two final senses as 
being constitutive of our concept of harm. 
  The second sense of harm concerns the “thwarting, setting back, or 
defeating of an interest” where interest is defined as having a “stake” in 
something—for example a company, a career, a family, a friendship—in such a 
way that one gains or loses relative to the condition of the thing in which one has 
an interest.17  The larger the interest in the object of interest, the greater the loss 
when that interest is thwarted or set back.  In Feinberg’s example, if a company in 
which I have invested only a few shares collapses, I may not feel terribly worse off 
but if I lose my job, the well-being of my family and the future of my career may 
be threatened in such a way that I experience a much greater sense of loss.  A 
person’s interests can be set back for a variety reasons, including natural disasters 
or bad luck, but Feinberg points out that a person’s interests are only thwarted in 
                                                 
17 Feinberg, Harm to Others, 33-4. 
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the legal sense when they are  “... ‘invaded’ by human beings, either by [one]self 
acting negligently or perversely, or by others, singly, or in groups and 
organizations” and “the test for for whether such an invasion has in fact set back an 
interest is whether that interest is in a worse condition than it would have otherwise 
been in had the invasion not occurred at all”.18   
Feinberg’s distinction between welfare interests and ulterior interests is 
important to a consideration of his third sense of harm as well as our discussion of 
human rights in relation the to the TCF industry.   He categorizes ulterior interests 
as the goals, aspirations, and projects that we develop over our lives, that become 
important to us, and that we desire to see accomplished.  Welfare interests are a 
more basic kind of interest.  They are general and their harmonious fulfillment is a 
necessary step in the pursuit of other ulterior interests.  Feinberg writes that  
In this category are interests in the foreseeable interval of one’s life, and the 
interests in one’s own physical health and vigor, the integrity and normal 
functioning of one’s own body, the absence of absorbing pain and suffering 
grotesque disfigurement, minimal intellectual acuity, emotional stability, the 
absence of groundless anxieties and resentments, the capacity to engage 
normally in social intercourse and to enjoy and maintain friendships, at least 
minimal income and financial security, a tolerable social and physical 
environment, and a certain freedom from interference and coercion.... They 
are the “basic requisites of a man’s well-being”, but by no means the whole 
of that well-being itself.19 
Depending on a person’s circumstances, welfare interests may be a person’s 
only interests.  If one experiences a great deal of hardship, surviving by addressing 
one’s welfare interests might be one’s only, and most pressing, concern.  What is 
more, it is possible to envision overlap and inter-relations between different 
welfare interests.  They must be taken together, because “... welfare interests, taken 
together, are only as strong as their weakest link”.20  In other words, a strong heart 
                                                 
18 Ibid., p.34 
19 Ibid., p.37 
20 Ibid., p.37 
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does not make up for a lack of food any more than a steady minimal income can 
assure safety in a police state.  Furthermore, Feinberg suggests that impeding 
welfare interests represents the most serious harm that can be visited upon a 
person.  This can be explained in one way by the basic and necessary nature of 
welfare interests: for example,  if I were to impede an individual’s access to a 
minimal income, I would be causing a great deal more harm than if I simply 
impede the purchase of the newest model of car.  However, the severity of 
impeding someone’s welfare interests is best explicated by the confluence of 
welfare interests with basic moral claims.    
The welfare interests then are grounds for valid claims against others (moral 
rights) par excellence.  They are reasonable interests reasonably ascribed, if 
not to every person in the world without exception, at least to the standard 
person that must always be before the legislator’s eye.21 
 As the grounds for the moral claims that we have against others, welfare 
interests provide a bar that helps us to measure both when an individual is being 
impeded from pursuing their primary (welfare) interests and how this relates to 
being wronged.  As the basis of valid and universal moral claims, we can identify 
basic moral rights that correspond to these welfare interests.  This is important 
when we consider the third sense of harm that Feinberg illustrates. 
The third sense of harm is distinguishable from the second sense by its 
focus on being wronged which in turn is understood in terms of rights violations.   
To say that A has harmed B in this sense is to say much the same thing as 
that A has wronged B, or treated him unjustly.  One person wrongs another 
when his indefensible (unjustifiable and inexcusable) conduct violates the 
others right, and in all but certain very special cases such conduct will also 
invade the other’s interest and thus be harmful in the sense already 
explained.22          
                                                 
21 Ibid., p.112 
22 Ibid., p.34 
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Being wronged in this case refers to a standard of rights that we bear and 
that require respect.  Feinberg argues that our understanding of harm must include 
the overlap of both the second and third sense of harm, so if we are wronged but no 
setback in our interest is measured, or if we experience a setback in our interests 
with no corresponding wrong, then a harm has not occurred.  This is a crucial 
point: the existence of a harm may hang on our ability to measure both of these two 
aspects in the experience of the victim.  However, in the case of the thwarting of 
welfare interests, a wrong is necessarily present because of the intrinsic nature of 
welfare interests and their connection to basic moral rights.  This explains my  
focus on harms that involve a setback in welfare interests: they are the more dire 
and the more easily identified cases of harm.   
It should be noted that the process that I am laying out for identifying harm 
is not a case of identifying wrongs with the violation of legal rights—an avenue 
that Feinberg warns against23.  Rather, this is a process of identifying harm with the 
violation of moral rights that are themselves understood in terms of a setback in a 
universal set of basic interests (welfare interests), that concord with a conception of 
basic moral rights that we all possess, and that we can claim against others.  As we 
have seen, moral rights are often accompanied by enforcement rights that 
themselves found claims against the state, but these may or may not be codified 
into law and therefore moral rights may or may not be legal rights.  As Feinberg 
explains, associating harm with a violation of legal rights would be circular: we 
would be required to measure harm according to pre-existing legal rights but legal 
rights are designed in the first place in an attempt to prevent harm. 
The preceding framework provides a clear method for understanding and 
conceptualizing harm.  It captures most western intuitions regarding the moral 
relationship between individuals and the state in liberal societies and it gives us a 
framework to begin to work out responsibility.  Setbacks in welfare interests and 
their corresponding rights violation direct responsibility to the state for failing to 
                                                 
23 Ibid., p.110-111 
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meet enforcement claims against it where individual perpetrators, responsible in 
clear sense for a rights violation, can be identified.  I would now like to apply this 
framework to the case of sweatshops in a schematic way in order to better 
understand harm in that context.  I will suspend, momentarily, the question of 
whether this model applies to acts that exceed borders in order to address that 
question in greater detail in the next chapter.  For now, I will assume that 
Feinberg’s model is sound and apply it, in a straightforward way, to sweatshop 
labour. 
Harm and Sweatshops 
In the conceptualization of sweatshop labour as a harm, it is advisable, as 
Feinberg warns, to avoid the pitfall of applying a purely legal standard.  Legal 
rights are subject to changes and variations and they cannot constitute an effective 
means of judging the existence of a harm in an absolute manner.  To understand 
how sweatshop labour is a harm, we are best served by referencing a more general 
concept, in this case welfare interests and basic moral rights.  Proceeding in this 
way implies the use of a minimum standard, or floor, where the constituent parts of 
the standard are the notions of welfare interests and, in particular, basic economic 
human rights.  When conditions on a factory floor set back welfare interests in a 
measurable and important way and basic economic human rights are not respected, 
conditions in the factory can be categorized as harmful.  If conditions improve such 
that the worker’s relevant welfare interests are no longer set back and basic 
economic rights are respected then the categorization of the factory conditions as 
harmful can be lifted.  Operating according to this type of minimum standard helps 
to clarify the existence of harm for consumers separately from the reception of 
benefits for the work.  Workers may not have many work options available to them 
and they may receive some earnings from sweatshop labour that help them survive 
but these facts can be kept separate from the existence of harm.  The use of a 
minimum standard for the definition of harm allows consumers to apprehend the 
harm of sweatshop labour despite the existence of benefits and despite the lack of 
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viable alternatives, thus motivating consumer action in a more coherent way.  Let 
us see not only how sweatshop conditions set back or thwart the welfare interest of 
workers in realizing basic financial, emotional, physical, intellectual, and social 
well-being, but also how they violate basic economic human rights.    
Consider the following definition of sweatshops proposed by Arnold and 
Hartman.  
Sweatshops are defined as any workplace in which workers are typically 
subject to two or more of the following conditions: systematic forced 
overtime; systematic health and safety risks that stem from negligence or 
the wilful disregard of employee welfare; coercion; systematic deception 
that places workers at risk; underpayment of earnings; and income for a 48 
h[our] work week less than the overall poverty rate for that country (one 
who suffers from overall poverty lacks the income necessary to satisfy 
one’s basic non-food needs such as shelter and basic health care).24 
 
All of these factors constitute obstacles for workers in the achievement of 
minimal levels of well-being, whether that well-being is understood in terms of an 
adequate family life, good health, financial stability, intellectual development or 
any number of other conceptions.  In terms of welfare interests, the interest in one’s 
own health and vigour and the interest in a tolerable social and physical 
environment are thwarted by systematic health and safety risks in sweatshops and 
disregard for employee welfare.  An interest in a minimal income and financial 
security are set back by the underpayment of earnings and wages below the overall 
poverty rate.  Coercion and deception in sweatshops thwart one’s interest in living 
free from these types of interference and so on.  Alleviating any of these conditions 
would mean alleviating a burden on workers.    
Coupled with a setback or thwarting of interests, the aforementioned 
conditions also violate our best understandings of basic economic human rights.  
                                                 
24 D.G Arnold and , L.P. Hartman  “Beyond Sweatshops: Positive Deviancy and Global Labour 
Practices”, Business Ethics: A European Review, 14 (2005) : 207.  See Ellen Israel Rosen, Making 
Sweatshops: The Globalization of the U.S. Apparel Industry (Berkeley: University of California 
Press, 2002), chapter 2 and Naomi Klein, No Logo (New York: Picador 1999), especially chapter 9, 
for empirical accounts of the working conditions in TCF sweatshops. 
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For instance, articles 22-24 of the Declaration of Human Rights seeks to define 
certain basic economic rights such as favourable work conditions, equitable pay, 
and reasonable hours.25  These basic economic rights have been elaborated upon in 
a number of international documents and treaties, most notably by the International 
Labour Organization and their notion of “decent work”.26  The conditions in 
sweatshops, regardless of the legal or national  jurisdiction where those sweatshops 
happen to occur, simply do not meet the moral standards set out in our most clearly 
defined conceptions of basic economic human rights or in terms of general welfare 
interests.  In this way, sweatshop labour conditions can be considered harmful to 
workers.   
  The fulfilment of welfare interests and basic economic human rights 
establishes a minimum standard by which we can establish whether certain work 
conditions are acceptable or not.  By defining the conditions in these terms, those 
who contribute to the harm of sweatshop labour can begin to conceptualize their 
responsibility for alleviating these conditions in relation to their contributions.    
However, concluding that certain conditions are harmful carries significant 
normative weight and raises questions regarding our moral duties to intervene or 
prevent the harmful conditions.  Consequently, objections exist that would seek to 
undermine arguments for the harmfulness of sweatshop labour or restrict the extent 
of our duties to respond.  I will address one prominent argument here that focuses 
on the relative benefits gained by sweatshop workers who perform this kind of 
labour and the autonomy of the workers to choose a form of employment as a 
means of arguing against interventions to prevent sweatshop labour.   I will show 
that this objection does not speak to the essential harmfulness of sweatshop labour 
itself thus directing consumer attention away from their duties to avoid 
contributing to harm.  Furthermore, I will suggest that interventions to prevent 
                                                 
25 “The Univeral Declaration of Human Rights”, accessed June 24, 2010, 
http://www.un.org/en/documents/udhr/index.shtml#a21  
26 “Decent Work”, International Labour Organization, accessed August 2, 2010,  
http://www.ilo.org/global/About_the_ILO/Mainpillars/WhatisDecentWork/lang--en/index.htm   
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harm need not require the eradication of factory work altogether: interventions that 
improve work standards and economic growth can go hand in hand.  Presenting 
intervention in sweatshop labour as an either / or choice—meaning a choice 
between the complete eradication of sweatshop labour or the acceptance of the 
status quo—constrains consumers from adequately conceptualizing their 
responsibility.        
Matt Zwolinski provides a defense of non-intervention in sweatshop labour.   
His presentation is useful because his work involves an attempt to represent a vast 
number of arguments in support of a stance of non-intervention in sweatshops.  He 
focuses his argument on the importance that choice plays in our moral evaluations 
and he summarizes the core of his approach in the following way. 
1. Most sweatshop workers choose to accept the conditions of their 
employment, even if their choice is made from among a severely 
constrained set of options. 
 
2. The fact that they choose the conditions of their employment from 
within a constrained set of options is strong evidence that they view it as 
their most-preferred option (within that set). 
 
3. The fact that they view it as their most-preferred option is strong 
evidence that we will harm them by taking that option away. 
 
4. It is also plausible that sweatshop workers’ choice to accept the 
conditions of their employment is sufficiently autonomous that taking 
the option of sweatshop labor away from them would be a violation of 
their autonomy. 
 
5. All else being equal, it is wrong to harm people or to violate their 
autonomy.  
 
6. Therefore, all else being equal, it is wrong to take away the option of 
sweatshop labor from workers who would otherwise choose to engage 
in it.27 
 
                                                 
27 Matt Zwolinksi  “Sweatshops, Choice, and Exploitation”, Business Ethics Quarterly, 17 (2007): 
695. 
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  To discuss Zwolinksi’s argument, I will use the same method that he 
employs and separate it into two parts.  Part one, including premises (1), (2), and 
(3) constitutes an argument based on preference.  The preference argument can be 
summarized in the following way.  Within the set of work options available to 
potential sweatshop workers,  sweatshop work represents a difficult, but preferred, 
employment option for individuals.  This preference suggests that the workers 
receive real benefits from the work and it would be wrong to deny them those 
benefits.  For instance,  Naila Kabeer points out that workers in TCF factories, who 
are predominantly women, consider their employment to be a better, safer, and 
more reliable option than the domestic or agricultural work that they would 
otherwise be consigned to perform. 28  Also, many women working in sweatshops 
gain valuable bargaining power within their couple because of the income they 
gain from the work, however small or unreliable the pay might be or however 
difficult the conditions might be.  Taking away this preferred option causes harm to 
the workers.  Of course, it may be empirically correct that sweatshop labour 
represents a better work option for most sweatshop labourers compared to 
competing jobs.  This fact does not negate the advantages of intervention nor does 
it address the essential harmfulness of sweatshop labour as such.  Competing work 
options for sweatshop labourers, and sweatshop labour itself, can still be harmful 
according to a baseline standard of welfare interests and basic economic human 
rights even though sweatshop labour is potentially less harmful than other work 
options.  The fact that workers prefer the benefits of sweatshop labour to the 
benefits procured from other forms of work available to them—while  sweatshop 
labour itself remains essentially harmful—only highlights the need to improve 
work standards overall to a morally acceptable level so that a large number of 
workers in the world do not have to choose from the most palatable poison when 
they seek employment.  To achieve this requires economic development, but as 
Jody Heymann and Alison Earle have demonstrated, this economic development 
                                                 
28 See Naila Kabeer “Globalization, Labour Standards, and Women’s Rights: Dilemmas of 
Collective (In) Action in an Interdependent World”, Feminist Economics, 10 (2004): 3-35. 
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can come with acceptable work standards.29  What is important to retain for 
consumers when they are evaluating the harm of sweatshop labour is the baseline 
judgement that it is, in fact, harmful regardless of whether the workers consider it 
to be a preferred option.  Finally, the interventions proposed in this paper do not 
seek to remove the preferred choice of workers but rather focus on engaging 
consumers in projects that stimulate improved regulation on sweatshop floors.   
The second part of Zwolinski’s argument focuses on autonomy and the role 
that autonomous choice plays in our normative accounts of harm.  Zwolinski 
suggests that the autonomous choice of a specific set of conditions can change our 
moral stance on those circumstances even if the conditions seem harmful.  With 
premises (4) and (5), Zwolinski asks us to consider the implications of violating the 
autonomy of workers by taking away a work option that they chose autonomously.  
This claim does not address the essential harmfulness of sweatshop labour either.  
In fact, implicit in Zwolinski’s argument is the notion that sweatshop labour is 
harmful in some way but that it would be more harmful to interfere in the 
perpetuation of sweatshop labour because such an act would transgress the 
preferences and autonomous choices of workers.  Zwolinski does not attempt to 
use choice to place the harmfulness of sweatshop labour in question.  Rather, he 
argues that violating preferences and disregarding autonomy is, in some way, more 
harmful than the work conditions themselves, thus necessitating a position of non-
interference.  With regards to Feinberg’s definition of harm, we cannot say that it is 
in the worker’s interest to work in sweatshops in order to sustain themselves—it 
being their preferred option—therefore negating the possibility that a setback in 
interests has occured and undermining the existence of harm.  This line of 
argumentation ignores the fundamental role that the concept of welfare interests 
and moral rights play in Feinberg’s definition.  Our welfare interests and basic 
moral rights must be addressed before pursuing more complex projects.  Even 
though sweatshop work may provide a better way of pursuing these welfare 
                                                 
29 Heymann and Earle, Raising the Global Floor, especially chapters 2 and 3. 
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interests relative to other options, the work itself can remain harmful in a baseline 
sense because those welfare interests fail to be fulfilled and basic economic human 
rights continue to be violated.  In terms of Zwolinski’s position, what we are left 
with is an evaluation of the extent to which violating preferences and autonomy is 
more harmful than the conditions themselves, a strategy that asks us to weigh the 
harmfulness of the conditions in sweatshops against the harmfulness of an 
intervention.  In terms of autonomy, this argument gains its force from the level of 
autonomy that the workers possess when they choose to accept sweatshop 
conditions.  To undermine the second part of Zwolinski’s argument, we would 
need to identify substantial constraints on workers that could erode their autonomy, 
thus making sweatshop work a non-consensual, and therefore more forcefully 
harmful, act.  This makes the argument based on autonomy a matter of degree.  It is 
possible to imagine a purely autonomous choice as it is possible to imagine 
increasingly reduced autonomy as the number or strength of constraints increases.   
As constraints mount—and they could include limited work options, poverty, and 
poor health—autonomy is reduced and the force of Zwolinski’s position is 
weakened.  I will not address in detail here the empirical conditions that contribute 
to the entry of most individuals in sweatshops. However, it is possible to imagine a 
number of constraints in the lives of workers that could undermine cases for a 
straightforward autonomous choice, constraints that Zwolinski readily admits in 
premises (1) and (2).  And if very little autonomy is exercised by workers when 
they enter sweatshops, it is more difficult to say that an intervention would be 
harmful in a way that is more significant than the harm caused by the work 
conditions themselves.  Furthermore, Zwolinski’s method of proceeding would 
have us overlook the benefits that workers might experience by working under 
better conditions.  Intervention need not mean cessation; rather, an intervention 
could include better regulation in order to implement better work standards.  This 
type of intervention, which western workers experience everyday in the form of 
state-run agencies and unions, would seem to be a desirable trade-off for a limited 
violation of autonomy.      
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To conclude, we are left with a case where sweatshop labour can be 
considered harmful in a morally significant way according to a baseline conception 
of harmfulness.  It is very important to keep this baseline evaluation in mind in 
order to develop a coherent conceptualization of consumer responsibility.  
Consumers need to maintain their focus on the ways in which sweatshop labour 
falls below a baseline understanding of decent work in order to begin to 
conceptualize their responsibility to respond in order to improve or prevent these 
conditions.  Entering into debates regarding trade-offs between the benefits of 
working in a sweatshop versus the benefits of not having the choice to work in 
sweatshops can easily distract consumers from the essentially harmful conditions 
of these factories and draw us into an either / or strategy where taking 
responsibility for the harm on factory floors is equated with the cessation of 
sweatshops—and the removal of all benefits—something that may not be the case. 
I believe the previous account is a plausible and coherent way for 
consumers to conceptualize sweatshop labour as harmful.  Before entering a 
discussion of consumer responsibility for this harm, it is important to address ways 
that consumers can understand their connection to this harm.   
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Chapter 3 – Conceptualizing Connection 
Up to this point, I have not offered a defense for why the framework of 
harm that has been presented earlier should apply across borders.  After all, 
Feinberg’s conception of harm was developed within the context of the nation-
state, not as a model that necessarily applies internationally.  To be fully consistent 
with Feinberg’s model would be to relegate responsibility for sweatshops to the 
affected state, in terms of a role-responsibility of the state to assure that minimal 
work standards are respected for its citizens.  However, as we shall see, the nature 
of the global TCF industry and unstructured collective harms is such that 
consumers are connected to workers via international systems of economic 
cooperation and social structures that cross borders.  This means that the aggregate 
effects of the acts of consumers can influence distant others in significant ways, 
thus giving rise to the problem of conceptualizing consumer responsibility beyond 
nation-centred approaches while leaving the previous conceptualization of harm 
intact.  To explain how the proposed understanding of harm need not change 
despite the international character of consumer implication in sweatshop labour, it 
is necessary to show how consumers can understand all individuals to be bearers of 
basic economic human rights, and therefore agents capable of suffering harm.  To 
do this, I will first elaborate on the role that moral cosmopolitanism plays in 
conceptions of consumer responsibility.  Next, I will propose different ways that 
consumers can understand their connection to sweatshop harm in economic terms.  
A discussion will follow of the ways that the concept of social structure can deepen 
consumer understanding of their participation in, deeper, collective ventures.  After 
all, while it may be possible to define the harm of sweatshop labour in a coherent 
way according to a baseline standard, and then to extend this standard 
internationally with a cosmopolitan thesis, the existence of the harm remains 
meaningless to consumers—and therefore beyond the range of their understanding 
of personal responsibility—if there is no adequate way of conceptualizing 
consumer connection to it.     
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Moral Cosmopolitanism 
 
To provide an account of the moral foundations of connection that 
consumers have with sweatshop workers in a rights-based system, I will propose 
that weak versions of moral cosmopolitanism are both necessary and sufficient to 
extend the moral sphere of consumers to distant others.  If in the eyes of consumers 
sweatshop workers are possible sufferers of harm and plausible connections 
between these actors can be established, then accounts of responsibility become 
possible.  Let us start with a basic account of moral cosmopolitanism. 
Thomas Pogge, a prominent defender of liberal cosmopolitanism, writes 
that “[m]oral cosmopolitanism holds that all persons stand in certain moral 
relations to one another: we are required to respect one another’s status as ultimate 
units of moral concern”, a definition which he notes captures three essential 
characteristics of moral cosmopolitanism: it is individualistic, general, and 
universal. 30  It focuses on the individual as the primary unit of moral concern—for 
instance, as the bearer of certain inalienable rights—it applies to all individuals 
equally, and it is general in the sense that it is applied globally.  Conversely, in his 
discussion of the concept,  Charles Beitz writes that  
The force of moral cosmopolitanism is clearest when we consider what it 
rules out: cosmopolitanism stands opposed to any views that limits the 
scope of justification to the members of particular types of groups, whether 
identified by shared political values, communal histories, or ethnic 
characteristics.31    
Beitz highlights the inclusiveness of moral cosmopolitanism and its 
incompatibility with approaches that limit moral considerations to the boundaries 
of the state. However, he points out that moral cosmopolitanism is inconclusive 
when we begin to ask what kind of treatment it requires in a substantial sense, for 
                                                 
30  Thomas Pogge, World Poverty and Human Rights: Cosmopolitan Responsibilities and Reforms  
(Cambridge: Polity, 2008) : 175, italics are the authors. 
31 Charles Beitz, “Cosmopolitanism and Global Justice”, Journal of Ethics, 9 (2005): 17. 
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instance whether that treatment be egalitarian, global re-distribution, or dessert-
based considerations.  The indeterminacy of moral cosmopolitanism, in terms of 
what it requires of us, is clearly a limitation of the approach when it is applied in 
certain contexts, especially institutional design.  Beitz suggests that some of this 
indeterminancy can be addressed by distinguishing more clearly between different 
versions of moral cosmopolitanism.  Following the thought of a number of writers, 
Beitz notes the distinction between  “weak” and “strong” or “radical” and “mild” 
versions of moral cosmopolitanism.32  For instance, in National Responsibility and 
Global Justice, David Miller writes that “...weak cosmopolitanism requires that we 
show equal moral concern for human beings everywhere, while strong 
cosmopolitanism goes beyond this to demand that we should afford them equal 
treatment, in a substantive sense.33  For Miller, “weak” versions of 
cosmopolitanism are “...in the first place a claim about moral value”34 and do not 
fall prey to the same contentions that arise from the more substantive demands of 
stronger versions.  On the contrary, weak versions of moral cosmopolitanism have 
broad appeal and are relatively uncontroversial.  But, if we discount stronger 
versions of the moral cosmopolitanism thesis because of the indeterminancy that 
they require, are we left with a notion that is useful in the context that concerns us 
here?  Or, do weak versions lack the resources for stabilizing consumer 
responsibility in an adequate way?   
To begin, within a framework that defines harm according to human rights, 
it is necessary to adopt a premise that supports the claim that all individuals are 
                                                 
32 Beitz points out that a number of authors have made similar distinctions between these two poles 
of cosmopolitanism including Samual Scheffler in “Conceptions of Cosmopolitanism,” pp.114-115, 
Simon Caney in “Review Article: International Distributive Justice”, pp.975-976 and David Miller 
in  “The Limits of Cosmopolitan Justice,” in David R. Mapel and Terry Nardin (eds.), International 
Society  (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999): 166. 
33 David Miller, National Responsibility and Global Justice (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2007): 43-44.   I have decided to focus here on a more recent formulation of the weak versus strong 
strong distinction adopted by Miller.  
34 Ibid., p.28  
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bearers of human rights in a legitimate and substantial way.  Without the 
aforementioned premise, consumers cannot adequately conceive of distant others 
as potential sufferers of harm.  If human rights only applied to particular groups, a 
clear conceptual contradiction would arise between the purported universality of 
human rights and its application according to group membership.  To move beyond 
this contradiction, a weak moral cosmopolitan position is necessary.  In the same 
way, weak moral cosmopolitanism is sufficient to underwrite the idea that all 
individuals are possessors of welfare interests and basic economic human rights, 
regardless of nationality, and therefore potential sufferers of harm.  This enables a 
conception of harm, based on human rights, to be extended internationally.  
Furthermore, in terms of consumer responsibility in the context of individual 
contributions to a collective problem, weak moral cosmopolitanism establishes a 
connection between distant others and the consumer.  Operating within individual 
moral reasoning,  individual consumers can conceive of distant others as potential 
sufferers in the same way as they themselves are potential sufferers, thus 
establishing psychologically stable moral relationship between themselves and 
sweatshop workers.  While the sweatshop might exist in a different country, weak 
moral cosmopolitanism suggests that we are all capable of experiencing the harm 
of sweatshop labour in the same way.  As a consumer, if I contribute by my 
actions—even marginally—to distant suffering, the case for responsibility on my 
part is both stronger and psychologically more stable if I can relate to this suffering 
rather than believing myself to be immune to it.  Consumers can stay within the 
boundaries of weaker versions in order to conceptualize ways that the connections 
they have with distant others enables their acts to contribute to harm.  Giving equal 
moral concern to others is enough, within the restricted sphere of action of the 
consumer and within the current economic order, to give moral character to the 
marginal contributions that consumers make and thereby provide the possibility for 
consumers to exercise their moral reasoning in ways that contribute instead to 
positive, rather than harmful, outcomes.  Next, I would like to discuss structural 
connections between consumers and sweatshop harm in more detail.   
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Structural Connection 
Weak moral cosmopolitanism is sufficient to extend the moral sphere of 
consumers to include the effect of their actions on distant others but a more 
detailed treatment of the actual connections between consumers and sweatshops is 
still required.  It is important to establish whether, and in what ways, the actual 
economic and social connections between these actors provide the capacity for 
consumers to affect the situation of distant workers.  To do this, I will first outline 
how the structural conditions that are prevalent in the TCF industry and in the 
global economy increase the likelihood that workers will experience sweatshop 
conditions.  I will discuss how the concept of social structure enables consumers to 
better understand the ways that they participate in the reproduction of these 
structures and how, collectively, consumers can influence change in these 
structures.  This will provide a more complete account of consumer connection to 
sweatshops.   
 
We can begin an account of connection in the TCF industry by reiterating 
some of the basic features of economic globalization.   As we have seen, the 
intensification of economic interaction that has occured over the past five decades 
has created industries where economic activity is not restrained to regions or 
countries but instead spans the globe.  This trend became evident in the TCF 
industry as early as 2000 when the Tripartite Meeting on Labour Practices dubbed 
it a global, “one-world employer”.    
 
...global inasmuch as production activities are worldwide and connected 
through various arrangements and strategic decisions to serve the world 
market; global in so far as trade, which is expanding more rapidly than the 
average of the manufacturing sector, is highly influenced by the changing 
characteristics of international competitiveness and the relocation strategies 
implemented by global companies; and global because the geographical 
distribution of world employment is affected by the rapid changes in 
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production and trade. TCF industries can be regarded, accordingly, as a 
“one-world employer”. 35   
 
The nature of the TCF industry as a “one-world” employer is such that 
employment, production, and consumption are linked together into global systems 
of trade.   This suggests that consumer selection of some products—based on taste, 
price, or other factors—stimulates an increased production of that product beyond 
regional and national boundaries.  For instance, multinational corporations (MNCs) 
respond to consumer choices by increasing or decreasing their production to meet 
demand.  These increases or decreases affect manufacturing of the product, through 
sub-contracting, in different manufacturing zones across the world.  Consumers can 
stimulate new markets, contribute to the eradication of markets, or perpetuate 
existing markets, by exercising their choice collectively.  On the ground, this 
means that manufacturing contracts, and therefore employment opportunities, are 
increased or decreased partly due to the collective purchasing choices made by 
consumers all over the world.  How should consumers understand how their 
choices gain moral weight beyond simply being a function of the use of their 
purchasing power in a global industry?  
 
We begin to perceive a moral character to the relationship between 
consumers and workers when we consider how structural conditions in the global 
TCF industry increase the likelihood that workers will experience sweatshop 
conditions.  For instance, it is common for MNCs to shift their manufacturing 
contracts to those countries where labour conditions are lax in order to increase 
profits.  This can place some downward pressure on states to decrease labour 
regulations.  Against the backdrop of economic globalization, countries are 
                                                 
35 From “Labour Practices in the Footwear, Leather, Textiles, and Clothing Industry: Report for 
Discussion at the Tripartite Meeting on Labour Practices in the Footwear, Leather, Textiles, and 
Clothing Industry, Geneva 2000”, International Labour Organisation, accessed June 30, 2010, 
http://www.ilo.org/public/english/dialogue/sector/techmeet/tmlfi00/tmlfi-r.pdf   
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encouraged to use their comparative advantage in order to integrate into the global 
economy in ways that are most advantageous and productive for their particular set 
of circumstances.  In the TCF industry, the comparative advantage of many low-
income countries is a large supply of inexpensive labour.  The result, globally, has 
been a shift in manufacturing from higher-income countries to lower-income 
countries as MNCs “out-source” production to areas in the world where their 
products can be produced more cheaply.36  An example of this trend is the creation 
of Economic Processing Zones (EPZs) in low-income countries as a way of 
attracting more foreign investment to domestic manufacturing centres.37  The out-
sourcing of labour to low-income countries has led, in some instances, to access to 
a set of jobs for some that would otherwise have been unavailable.  However, many 
of these jobs have been categorized as sweatshop labour.  Different conditions 
contribute to this problem.  For instance, the institutional networks of many low-
income countries remain weak, reducing the ability of these countries to enforce 
effective labour standards even when national law or international treaties have 
been adopted domestically for this purpose.  In other cases, low-income countries 
have been encouraged to decrease labour regulation in order to more effectively 
integrate into the global economy, with increased income inequality and poorer 
work conditions as a result.38    Many of the structural conditions that exacerbate 
the problem of sweatshop labour are beyond the control of individual consumers.  
Clearly, consumers cannot control the domestic policy of distant countries or the 
                                                 
36  D.G Arnold and , L.P. Hartman,  ``Beyond Sweatshops: Positive Deviancy and Global Labour 
Practices``, 207. 
37 “Export processing zones (EPZs) are industrial parks set up in certain countries to attract foreign 
and domestic investment in export industries. They use tax incentives and dedicated infrastructure 
to lower entry and operating costs for enterprises which would not otherwise have considered 
investing in that country.” See International Labour Organisation,  
http://www.ilo.org/public/english/dialogue/sector/techmeet/tmlfi00/tmlfir.htm#_Toc488740561 .  
accessed August 2, 2010. 
38 See Narcis Serra and Joseph E. Stiglitz, eds., The Washington Consensus Reconsidered: Towards 
a New Global Governance  (Oxford, Toronto: Oxford University Press, 2008): 10-11.  The editors 
explain how increased labour market flexibility, prescribed by the Washington Consensus, has often 
led to greater inequality in incomes overall. 
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actions of global economic institutions.  However, some structural aspects of the 
TCF industry are within the collective sphere of control of consumers.  To deepen 
our account of the ways that consumers participate and influence structures within 
the TCF industry, I will turn to the work of Iris Marion Young and her Social 
Connection Model. 
In her article ''Responsibility and Global Justice: A Social Connection 
Model'', Young builds her account of the moral significance of global connections 
on the work of Charles Beitz  and Onora O’Neill.  Young cites Beitz’ work in 
Political Theory and International Relations, explaining how Beitz challenged the 
Rawlsian restriction of obligations of justice to shared national institutions by 
virtue of the economic processes and dense relationships that link us together 
across borders, thus grounding duties of justice that apply globally and raising the 
need for the development of institutions to regulate those relationships in sufficient 
ways.39  Next, Young builds on Onora O’Neill’s claim that the scope of our moral 
obligations extends to all those whom we assume through the conduct of our 
affairs, referencing O’Neill’s claim that the increased connection brought about by 
globalization is such that 
... our actions assume these others as a condition for our own actions... we 
have made practical moral commitments to them by virtue of our actions. 
That is, even when we are not conscious of or when we actively deny a 
moral relationship to these other people, to the extent that our actions 
depend on the assumption that distant others are doing certain things, we 
have obligations of justice in relation to them.40 
 
O’Neill’s position requires us to think about our obligations to those whose 
cooperation is essential to the production and reproduction of our life situation.  
                                                 
39 Iris Marion Young,  ''Responsibility and Global Justice: A Social Connection Model'', Social 
Philosophy and Policy Foundation, 23 (2006): p.105.   
 
40 Ibid., 106. Young references Onora O’Neill’s work in Faces of Hunger ( London: Allen, 1985)  
and Toward Justice and Virtue (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996): chapter 4 to 
support this claim.   
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Without the cooperation of distant others, however tacit and unconscious it may be, 
we simply cannot access many of the goods that we desire in our lives.   
At this point, Young is attempting to establish how our connections to 
distant others gain moral significance.  To deepen the account of the moral 
significance of these connections, Young suggests ways that our actions gain 
greater influence over the life situation of distant others by proposing the concept 
of social structure and structural injustice.  She bases the concept of social structure 
on the work of a diverse group of theorists, beginning with Peter Blau and Pierre 
Bourdieu, who stress that social structure is “multidimensional space” or “‘fields 
on which individuals stand in varying positions in relation to one another offering 
possibilities for interpretation and action” and that social structure “...consists in 
the connections among those positions and their relationships, and the way the 
attributes of positions internally constitute one another through those 
relationships.” 41  She uses examples like racial or ethnic relations that, in the 
context of sweatshop labour, renders some workers more vulnerable to exclusion or 
domination than others.  It is the relationships between the different positions, and 
the specific attributes of the positions, that can enable or constrain the options of 
the individual.  However, Young continues by pointing out that social structure is 
not an entity that exists separately from social agents.  Rather, she follows Anthony 
Giddens in suggesting that social structure “exists only in the action and interaction 
of persons; it exists not as a state, but as a process” and that individuals reproduce 
social structures by forming actions based on knowledge of preexisting structures 
“...because they act according to rules and expectations and because their 
relationally constituted positions make or do not make certain resources available 
to them.”42    Young adds Jean-Paul Sartre’s concept of the practico-inert to this 
account, which she explains as the background conditions of future action or “the 
conditions under which actors act, a collective outcome of action which is often 
                                                 
41 Young, “Responsibility and Global Justice: A Social Connection Model “, 112. 
42 Ibid., 112-113. 
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impressed onto the physical environment” such as socio-historical effects on 
human action that constrain or enable future action in specific ways.43  The focus 
on social structure reduces the importance of individual intentional action or 
societal rules as the primary conditions for action.  Young distances herself from 
the effects of intentional action by agents, instead highlighting the ways that 
“structured social action and interaction [...] have collective results that no one 
intends, results that may be counter to the best intentions of the actors”.44  She 
refers to the unintentional results of collective action as counter-finalities, again 
following Sartre.  The notion of counter-finalities is particularly adept at capturing 
the nature of consumer relationships with sweatshop labour and we can see 
parallels here between this concept and the concept of unstructured collective 
harms.  Young and Kutz point out that structural conditions create situations where 
unintended collective effects arise from individual, relatively benign actions.  But, 
where Young plays down the importance of intentional action, Kutz will attempt to 
recuperate intentional action as a way of solving unstructured harms.  This focus on 
individual agency represents a split between the two theories, and I will return to 
the problem in the next chapter when I consider responsibility.   
Social structure serves to “expand or contract” the opportunites of 
individuals.  It enables certain sets of options for some while constraining or 
limiting a range of options for others. Within these structures, structural injustice 
can result when 
  
... social processes put large categories of persons under sytematic threat of 
domination and deprivation of the means to develop and exercise their 
capacities, at the same time as these processes enable others to dominate or 
have a wide range of opportunities for developing and exercising their 
capacities.45 
 
                                                 
43 Ibid., 113. 
44 Ibid., 114. 
45 Ibid., 114. 
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We recognize structural harms when the constraint on a group of 
individuals’ range of options becomes dire, systematic, and predictable.  
Furthermore, Young notes that structural systems are maintained, not only by 
institutional rules and norms, but also by sets of incentives and sanctions that make 
some courses of action more attractive or less costly or other courses of action 
particularly costly.46  In turn, these sets of incentives and sanctions are reproduced 
by a variety of actions taken by individuals.  Consumers who participate in the 
TCF industry direct their monetary contributions toward the profitability of 
sweatshop labour while the act of purchasing sweatshop goods, without 
considerations of the moral nature of the purchase, condones the acceptability of 
sweatshop labour and helps to perpetuate social structures that subjects some 
workers in the world to otherwise morally unacceptable working conditions for the 
benefit of relatively rich consumers, based mainly on the lottery of birthplace.  As 
consumers, the act of purchasing sweatshop products represents a very real action 
that implicates consumers in a system that is structured in ways that increase the 
likelihood of sweatshop labour.  A lack of contestation of the social structures that 
enable sweatshops only serves to deepen consumer implication.  In this way, 
consumers participate in the reproduction of social structures that perpetuate 
sweatshop labour through a variety of means, whether it be economic acts or 
cultural practices.  By becoming consciously aware of the social structures that 
they inhabit, consumers can begin to understand how their actions—which may 
haves seemed previously benign—take on moral significance.  Furthermore, 
consumers can begin to realize the ways that changes in their consumer behaviour 
can bring about changes in the social structures that connect them to distant harms.  
Young categorizes responsibility for the positive, collective modification of social 
structures in a particular way, and I will address her conceptualization in the 
following chapter.  For now, I would like to dwell longer on the nature of 
connections between consumers and sweatshops.   
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Speaking strictly in terms of the economic role of consumers, the entire 
structure of the global TCF industry is clearly beyond the control of any individual 
consumer but the collective purchases of consumers can have an important 
influence on particular structures.  Individually, consumer purchases are marginal 
but collectively these purchases can have an important influence.   Economically, 
purchases in the TCF industry send very real signals to the global economy that 
help to maintain particular sets of incentives that in turn help to reinforce the 
structures that perpetuate sweatshops.    In this case, the incentives take the form of 
profitability.  Hypothetically, if consumers refused to purchase any goods that were 
made in sweatshops (assuming, of course, that a set of conditions existed that aided 
in the realization of this type of collective choice) then the alignment of incentives 
within the structures that surround sweatshop labour would change.  In a word, 
sweatshop labour would no longer be profitable because the engine that drives the 
profitability—consumers—would have directed their collective power in different 
ways.  The collective power of consumers would serve to re-align important 
incentives in the TCF industry, thereby motivating other actors in the system to 
change their behaviour and leading to overall changes in the structures that 
surrounding sweatshops.  A change in incentives could lead to the creation of new 
structures that decrease the likelihood of sweatshop labour.  And while the 
purchasing act itself is relevant for its collective effect on the incentives that help 
guide the actions of other economic actors (such as MNCs, global institutions, and 
states) a conscious social contestation of the structures that perpetuate sweatshops 
strengthens the movement toward sweat-free industry. 
In this optic, it becomes possible to affect distant others by virtue of the 
social structures that connect individuals together.  Furthermore, by becoming 
aware of the social structures that they inhabit, consumers can begin to take steps 
to affect distant others in more positive ways by trying to change those same social 
structures.   By focusing on the effect of consumer choice on the manufacturing 
decisions of multinationals, consumers can proceed in the following way.  First, 
multinationals must respect the criteria that consumers use to choose one product 
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over another—whether those criteria include taste, price, or trendiness, for 
example—in order to remain competitive.  Second,  if consumers collectively 
applied a set of moral criteria to the selection of goods—including a stipulation that 
basic economic human rights be respected in the manufacturing process—then 
multinationals might respond by diverting more resources to programs of 
regulation in order to assure that work conditions on shop floors improve in order 
to meet consumer demand and to remain competitive.  This would simultaneously 
contribute to positive change in existing structures.  Along these same lines, 
consumer efforts to voice the reasons behind their application of moral criteria to 
their purchases can be seen as real attempts to change the social structures that 
connect these actors.  In other words, the act of including moral criteria in the 
selection of products changes the relationship between consumers and workers in 
order to include a wider set of moral considerations.  In line with Kutz, social 
structure provides resources for understanding consumer participation and 
implication in “deeper, systemic forms of collective action” and the consumer 
capacity for affecting change within this system.  This requires that consumers 
consider the collective effects of their actions and expand their considerations 
beyond the singular moment of purchase.  In turn, “...the moral significance of 
preexisting networks of collaboration...”47 is reinforced, thus increasing the 
potential that individuals will include a moral dimension in their deliberations in 
order to account for their collective responsibility.  
On a final note, in terms of sweatshops, the incentives that require 
modification are not difficult to identify.  It is profit that leads the major actors in 
the TCF industry to act in ways that reproduce structures that perpetuate 
sweatshops.  The challenge lies in organizing collective consumer action in such a 
way that the profitability of sweatshop labour will be modified and other, morally 
acceptable work conditions will be supported.  To achieve this, a conceptualization 
of consumer responsibility is required that motivates consumers to contest the 
                                                 
47 Kutz, Complicity, 189. 
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social structures that they participate in and to change their puchasing behaviour.    
In the next chapter, I will explore ways to approach consumer responsibility by 
addressing, in particular, the collective action problem that is at the heart of 
consumer support for sweatshops and the role that confrontation plays in 
addressing this effect. 
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Chapter 4 – Conceptualizing Responsibility 
 The final chapter of this work addresses the primary concern of this paper: a 
conceptualization of consumer responsibility within global systems of cooperation, 
specifically with regards to sweatshop labour.  In the previous chapters, I have 
proposed plausible ways that consumers can understand the harm of sweatshop 
labour and their connection to it.  The question remains, however, as to whether 
consumers are, in fact, responsible for sweatshop labour in a meaningful sense.  
Furthermore, a plausible way of conceptualizing that responsibility is still lacking.   
 I would like to begin by reiterating certain positions that have already been 
addressed.  First, while it makes sense to conceptualize harm according to a human 
rights model with a baseline measurement, such as one founded on the framework 
proposed by Feinberg, extending responsibility for harm beyond borders requires 
an extra step.  We have seen that a weak moral cosmopolitan position is both 
necessary and sufficient to achieve this.  Nation-centred approaches to 
responsibility tend to restrain accounts of responsibility for guaranteeing individual 
moral righs to actions of the state in the form of enforcement claims.  Two inter-
related conditions challenge a purely nation-centred account of responsibility for 
sweatshop labour.  First, the phenomenon of sweatshops that is subscribed within a 
system of global economic cooperation in which states have an incentive to 
disrespect basic economic moral rights in order to increase foreign investment in 
the domestic manufacturing sector.  This problem can be attenuated by government 
institutions that have difficulty enforcing high labour standards.  Furthermore, the 
influence of global market forces on state policy undermines the ability of the state 
to adequately regulate the working conditions of sweatshop workers on their soil.  
Second, and more particularly to the role that consumers play, contributions to 
sweatshop labour come from a variety of places that are beyond the borders and the 
jurisdiction of the affected state.  In the case of consumer contributions, these 
contributions are individually marginal but nevertheless significant when 
aggregated.  If we direct responsibility for the rectification of harm in sweatshops 
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to the affected state under these two conditions, our enterprise will be doomed to 
failure.  The global economic system that envelops states provides few incentives 
for affected states to increase regulation while significant contributors to the 
harm—such as consumers—are left unaddressed.   
 Within complex systems that connect actors together in the TCF industry, it 
is challenging to conceptualize consumer responsibility in a way that is stable, 
coherent, and manageable such that individuals can bring their moral reasoning to 
bear on the problem and clearly direct their purchasing power in more positive 
ways.  The following will be an attempt to construct just such a conceptualization.  
Ironically, we shall see that problems associated with the distribution of 
responsibility take us full circle to the requirement that the nation-state intervene in 
order to support collective solutions. 
Shared Responsibility, Fault, and Acknowlegdment Problems 
For a given collectively created outcome, if every contributor is responsible 
then it becomes easy for individuals to evade responsibility.  This is the challenge 
of collective responsibility: when individuals act collectively to bring about an 
outcome that could only have been brought about collectively, individual models of 
responsibility are undermined and individuals can escape direct responsibility.  
Unstructured collective harms suffer acutely from this problem. How do we 
conceptualize responsibility in this case?  I will briefly explore some solutions.   
One response to this problem is imputing responsibility to the individual by 
virtue of their membership in the collective.48  In this way, any consumer act 
automatically brings with it membership in the collective of consumers.  Once an 
individual has become a member of the collective of consumers he is exposed to 
                                                 
48  Authors who have explored this concept, and the conditions for disassociating oneself from 
group responsibility are Gary McGary, “Morality and Collective Liability” Journal of Value Inquiry, 
20  (1986) , 157-65 and, more recently, Juha Raikka, “On Disassociating Oneself from Collective 
Responsibility,” Social Theory and Practice, 23  (1997), 1-9.  
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responsibility for outcomes brought about by a specific subset of consumers.  This 
approach has the virtue of clarifying those who are responsible from those who are 
not, i.e., by virtue of those who consume and those who don’t, but obvious 
problems result.     Unfortunately, membership in the group of “consumers” is so 
vast that imputing individual responsibility solely on the basis of membership is 
not coherent.  Furthermore, responsibility based on membership in this case does 
not take individual actions into account.  Some individual consumer acts contribute 
more directly to a given harm than others.  If we are trying to discern responsibility 
for a given harm, the distinction between which acts contribute more closely to the 
harm and those that do not is an important distinction to maintain.  While causal 
patterns are difficult to follow in the TCF industry, for example, we can still 
distinguish some acts that are more relevent to the creation of the harm than others.  
One final concern involves disassociation.  The process of disassociating oneself 
from the collective of consumers, in order to avoid responsibility for the harm 
caused by a subset of the collective, is too demanding.  To begin with, an 
individual becomes a consumer by purchasing goods.  To rescind one’s 
membership in the collective of consumers would require one to cease purchasing 
goods and such an act is so demanding as to be absurd.  An alternative, in the TCF 
industry, would be to denounce the purchase of sweatshop goods by other 
consumers while refraining from these purchases oneself in order to disassociate 
from responsibility based on membership.  However, denouncing the acts of other 
consumers, and consuming in turn, still generates membership in the collective of 
consumers, thus exposing oneself to responsibility based on the membership 
approach.  Finally, it remains unclear how the collective, or individuals, are made 
to pay on this account.  Overall, the conceptualization of consumer responsibility 
based on membership seems inadequate for our purposes.     
Other forms of collective responsibility might be more appropriate.  For 
instance, we can consider the collective to be responsible as a whole, rather than 
individuals.  This type of “holistic” solution treats the collective of consumers as a 
single agent and forces the collective to pay, as a whole, for the harm that it brings 
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about rather than devolving responsibility to individuals.  This approach has the 
advantage of clearly identifying a single responsible agent—and it is assumed 
requiring that the collective resources of the agent be directed toward rectification.  
Unfortunately, as we have seen in chapter one, consumers, as a collective, do not 
possess the necessary organization and decision-making process to be considered a 
single moral agent and therefore imputations of collective responsibility of this sort 
are irrelevant.  Finally, if consumers were held responsible as a whole, the 
distinction would be lost between individual acts that contribute to sweatshops and 
those individual acts that do not.  Individual consumers, on this view, may not be 
able to coherently grasp their personal implication in the collective problem and 
therefore conceptualizing their personal responsibility and understanding how to 
change their individual behaviour will be difficult.    
  Another way to proceed would be to distribute responsibility among the 
individual members of the collective in proportion to their contributions to the 
harmful outcome, no matter how small or marginal these contribtutions might be, 
as opposed to holding the collective responsible as a whole.  This kind of shared 
responsibility is defended by Larry Mary in his book Sharing Responsibility where 
he argues that community members should extend their conception of 
responsibility to include a range of individual contributions to harm, including 
shame, regret, and taint, rather than an exclusive focus on guilt.49  This type of 
shared responsibility seems appropriate in the case of consumer responsibility.  On 
this account,  consumers can understand their responsibility for sweatshop labour 
in terms of the purchases that they make, the attitudes of western “consumerism” 
that they maintain, and the collective impact of the range of these individual 
actions on others.  Furthermore, a notion of a collectively created harm is retained 
because the harm in question could not have been brought about, it is assumed, 
without the individual contributions of each member.  Consumers can see 
themselves as members of a community that brings about a collective result and 
                                                 
49 Larry May,  Sharing Responsibility.  (Chicago: Chicago University Press  1992): 1. 
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therefore can develop a sense of accountability for their individual contributions to 
this collective result.      
While shared responsibility might be an adequate way of accounting for 
consumer responsibility for sweatshop labour, an important question remains 
regarding individual motivation within this form of collective responsibility.  If 
consumers adopt an understanding of their responsibility as being shared, will such 
a conceptualization be sufficient to motivate action or to engage a sense of fault 
that might lead consumers to change their behaviour in substantial ways?  Or, will 
the indeterminateness of this form of responsibility allow individuals to shirk their 
personal responsibility?  Without some binding sense of personal fault for a distant 
harm, and an appropriately structured moment in which to discharge individual 
responsibility, can even those consumers who recognize their shared responsibility 
be expected to take action in more positive ways?  What resources will they 
possess to direct their action in more positive ways?  Contrary to a sense of shared 
responsibility, perhaps an unavoidable sense of moral fault is required in order to 
kickstart the moral reasoning of consumers and incite changes in behaviour. 
Otherwise, it becomes easy to avoid acknowledging one’s responsibility, especially 
if the required changes in behaviour are inconvenient.    Without a binding sense of 
fault, it may become easy for individuals to deny their implication in the harm and 
to become free riders on the efforts of others to prevent the collective harm.  
However, invoking more stringent notions of fault in the case of consumer 
responsibility can become highly problematic and undermine the project of 
consumer responsibility entirely.  To explain, consider the following, stringent, 
legal understanding of fault presented by Feinberg.  On this presentation, the entire 
project of consumer responsibility falls like a house of cards and individual 
consumers easily wriggle out of any personal implication in the harm.  
...it will go without saying that, only people who, without good reason, 
voluntarily break the law—only those whose harmful conduct was 
unexcused and unjustified—should be convicted and punished.  These are 
the only people of who can truly be said that the harm is “their fault,” the 
only persons who are “to blame for it”, the only persons without 
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exculpating “defense”. Excused or justified wrongdoing is not wrongdoing 
at all, and without wrongdoing there is no “harming”, however severe the 
harm that might have resulted.50 
On this view, for punishment to be justifiable, the agent must have acted in 
a way that is not only unexcused and unjustified—which assumes that the agent 
chose to act in such a way with regards to the options available to him, a premise 
that further assumes that the agent understood those options and their 
consequences—but also that the agent’s actions are clearly and irrefutably 
connected to the outcome.  Actions that did not intend to cause harm, such as 
marginal contributions to collective acts that result in a harmful outcome, are 
excusable and justifiable on the individual level because the agent never intended 
harm and because the agent could not apprehend the effects of his individual acts 
when aggregated with other, similar acts.   While consumer responsibility does not 
involve punishment or the breaking of a law, many individuals will follow this 
form of reasoning when reflecting on their moral responsibility for sweatshop 
labour.  Did I cause the harm?  Did I intend  to harm anyone?  Am I blameworthy 
or at fault?  Answering negatively to these questions leads to a sense of vindication 
by the consumer and is therefore unlikely to motivate changes in purchasing 
behaviour.  This, coupled with free rider problems, threatens the viability of shared 
responsibility as an adequate conceptualization of consumer responsibility in the 
TCF industry.   
Utilizing a strict notion of fault gives room for consumers to excuse 
themselves by focusing attention on those who did act in unexcused and unjustified 
ways.  This, in turn, can bring theorizations back to the role-responsibility of the 
state.  For instance, sweatshop owners and managers on the factory floor who act 
coercively and instil harmful working conditions are most clearly at fault in the 
stringent way suggested above.  In turn, responsibility for rectifying the harm 
reverts to the affected state and individual consumer contributions are left 
unchecked and continue to have an important collective impact.  Meanwhile, 
                                                 
50 Feinberg, Harm to Others, 109, emphasis mine. 
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important systemic factors are unaddressed.  Those owners and managers who are 
held at fault will argue vehemently that they are forced to run sweatshops because 
of the intense pressure of the TCF industry.51  Often operating at the edge of 
solvency, these owners have little incentive or means to increase wages, decrease 
hours, or improve the physical state of their workplace.  Furthermore, focusing 
fault on managers and owners does not address the role of MNCs that drove the 
global market sub-contracting to the lowest bidder in order to save on production 
costs or states that create EPZ zones where labour regulations and taxes are 
lowered in order to attract investment.  The actions of MNCs and states, just like 
owners and managers on the shop floors, make sense in the context of the vast 
systems of cooperation—and the sanctions and incentives of this system—that link 
all these actors together.  Yet, focusing too strongly on structural reasons for the 
creation of harm only raises another problem: the overdetermination of systemic 
causes which also leads to the dilution of a personal sense of responsibility.  
Although structural factors are clearly very important, focusing too strongly on the 
role of structural factors can lead consumers to attribute too much fault to the 
system itself, rather than their own contributions.   
 In her Social Connection Model, Young suggests that the foundation of 
individual responsibility for structural injustice is the participation of individuals in 
the production and reproduction of social structures rather than individual intention 
or direct causal creation of harm. 
Individuals bear responsibility for structural injustice because they 
contribute by their actions to the processes that produce unjust outcomes.  
Our responsibility derives from belonging together with others in a system 
of interdependent processes of cooperation and competition through which 
we seek benefits and aim to realize projects [...] Within this scheme of 
social cooperation, each of us expects justice towards ourselves, and others 
can legitimately make claims on us.52 
 
                                                 
51 Young, “Responsibility and Global Justice: A Social Connection Model”, 110-11. 
52 Ibid., 119. 
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Young understands this responsibility, not according to a backward-looking 
liability model which would include some sense of fault for the wrongs that occur 
but rather in terms of a forward-looking model of responsibility.  This forward-
looking responsibility skirts the notion of fault and requires that the individual 
focus instead on future rectification via political engagements that change social 
structures in positive ways. This understanding of responsibility requires that 
individuals work to acknowledge the social structures that they inhabit and then 
take steps to engage collectively to alter these structures.  Unfortunately, if we 
explain the causes of harm largely in terms of systemic relationships, and then 
evacuate notions of fault from our conceptualizations of responsibility in exchange 
for a more forward-looking notion, then problems of acknowledgment arise that 
make the experience and discharge of responsibility difficult on the individual 
level.  In general, for the individual, focusing on structural causes for harm can 
facilitate a “shrugging off” of responsibility and an attribution of responsibility to 
systemic causes rather than engaging individual moral conceptions of fault and 
blame in order to motivate substantial changes in individual behaviour. 
Jacob Schiff explores the problems of acknowledgment that are likely to 
arise in relation to Young’s work in his article “Confronting Political 
Responsibility: the Problem of Acknowledgment”.  Schiff employs an experiential 
approach, similar to the  approach that informs much of Young’s work on the 
Social Connection Model, to develop his claims. The first limitation he identifies in 
the Social Connection Model is the likelihood of “thoughtlessness”, a 
phenonmenon which he believes would arise due to the limitation that we, as 
consumers, have in our ability to “confront our implication in, and therefore our 
responsibility for, structural injustice”.53  Every hasty consumer purchase of a 
product that was made in a sweatshop is an example of this kind of 
thoughtlessness.  The purchases seem benign and harmless, and no information 
                                                 
53 Jacob Schiff, “Confronting Political Responsibility: the Problem of Acknowledgment”, Hypatia, 
23, (2008): 104. 
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exists that confronts the consumer with conditions under which the product was 
made, so it becomes easy to not think about the possibility of sweatshop labour or 
to contemplate consumer implication in the types of social structures that 
perpetuate sweatshop harm.   Without a clear, uniform, reliable, and repetitive 
moment where consumers are confronted with their implication in the perpetuation 
of sweatshop labour, individual consumers will find it difficult to engage the 
forward-looking responsibility that Young proposes, or any type of responsibility 
at all.   
Schiff also identifies the problem of “bad faith” which is a “form of lying to 
oneself” whereby we conceal the truth about structural injustice from ourselves 
through the use of elaborate lies.54  Bad faith problems are perpetuated by 
inconsistent information regarding the exact nature of the harm and consumer 
connection too it.  Consumers may have been exposed to information about the 
working conditions in sweatshops.  They may be aware that the problem exists and 
that many of the products that they purchase were probably made by a distant 
sweatshop worker.  However, in the absence of uniform and reliable information 
that clearly indicates that the product in their hands was made in a sweatshop, 
consumers might develop lies in order to avoid the inconvenience of changing their 
habits.  For instance, consumers might think “sure sweatshops are bad, but at least 
the workers are getting paid something” or  “If I don’t buy this product, their work 
will have been for nothing” or “I don’t really know for sure where this was made, 
or by whom.  How can I be sure the worker was mistreated?”   Acting in bad faith, 
in this way, can be understandable considering consumers do not always have 
access to information at the point of purchase that would make this way of thinking 
difficult.  Furthermore, the comparative cheapness of sweatshop products, and a 
lack of ethical alternatives, promotes bad faith purchasing. 
  
Finally, Schiff considers “misrecognition” caused but the spatial distances 
between the harm of sweatshop labour and our experience of our implication in it.  
                                                 
54 Ibid., 105. 
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In other words, political and social arrangements mediate consumer exposure to the 
harm to the extent that consumers are limited in their ability to sustain exposure to 
the harm  at a level that would enable them to fully acknowledge their implication.  
This leads to routine misrecognition of consumer responsibility and an inability to 
sustain the experience necessary to motivate action.55  To counter problems of 
misrecognition, consumers would be required to be consistently confronted with 
clear, uniform, and reliable information regarding their implication in the 
perpetuation of sweatshop labour.  Constant confrontation with sweatshop harm 
reduces the chances that misrecognition problems will occur.  Furthermore, 
constant confrontation decreases the experiential sense of distance by making the 
suffering of distant others, and consumer connection to this suffering, more real 
and more relevant to the experience of the consumer. 
 Shared consumer responsibility, and forward-looking notions of 
responsibility that focus too strongly on structural factors for sweatshop labour, 
appear to be undermined by a lack of fault and the presence of acknowledgement 
problems.  Should the notion of consumer responsibility, in the absence of viable 
alternatives, be abandoned altogether?    Perhaps another concept would be more 
appropriate, in lieu of responsibility.  It might be more appropriate to focus on 
charity, for instance.  In this optic, consumers would be absolved of responsibility 
for sweatshop harm and could continue with their purchasing habits unfazed.  
Instead, to meet the requirements of morality, they could donate a certain 
percentage of their income to non-profit or charitable organizations that address the 
problem of sweatshop labour in other ways, perhaps by promoting unionization or 
by supplementing the income of sweatshop workers.  Peter Singer has defended the 
morality of charitable donations in a number of important works, building his 
arguments around his famous proposition that “...if it is in our power to prevent 
something bad from happening, without thereby sacrificing anything of comparable 
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moral importance, we ought, morally, to do it.”56  Singer suggests that we each 
have a personal, moral imperative to give some of our income away to charity 
because of the great impact that our donation can have on the lives of the extremely 
poor in contrast to the relatively small impact that the sum will have on our lives as 
affluent western citizens.  Singer employs straightforward consequentialist 
reasoning based on the notion of marginal utility: as relatively rich individuals, 
amount X will have a small impact on our overall well-being, relative to our 
overall income.  Conversely, that same amount X can have an enormous impact on 
the life of a single extremely poor individual if it is used by a charitable 
organization or non-profit to combat preventable diseases, to operate on a cataract, 
or to provide food, for example.  For Singer, to act morally is to donate amount X 
to charity rather than to keep it for oneself.  This is a compelling argument, but 
why should it be applied only to charitable donations?  As we have seen, there are 
plausible reasons for believing that consumers contribute to sweatshop labour and 
that consumers have the capacity to stimulate positive change in the TCF industry 
by changing their purchasing habits and contesting the social structures that 
perpetuate sweatshops.  The contributions of consumers to the harm and the 
capacity to bring about change within the global system that enables the harm 
suggests a moral responsibility.  The challenge is creating a moment where 
individuals can adequately realize their individual responsibility.     
Confrontation and the Realization of Consumer Responsibility 
In the previous chapter, a conceptualization of consumer responsibility that is 
theoretically sound and useful in terms of motivating significant changes in 
consumer behaviour was not found. Shared responsibility contained some aspects 
that seemed promising, but a conceptualization of consumer responsibility based 
solely on shared responsibility displayed weaknesses in terms of motivating 
                                                 
56 Peter Singer, “Famine, Affluence, and Morality”, Philosophy and Public Affairs,1, (1971) : 231.  
Singer reiterates this position in  One World  (London:  Yale University Press 2002)., chapter 5.  
More recently, in 2009, Singer has explored the morality of giving to charity in The Life You Can 
Save: Acting Now To End World Poverty published in Canada by Random House. 
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changes in individual behaviour when considered in contrast with notions of fault.  
On the other hand, structural factors proved to be essential for understanding how 
sweatshops are created but an overdetermination of the causal role of structural 
factors, by consumers, leads to acknowledgment problems that perpetuate 
unstructured collective harm.  Neither account—shared responsibility or structural 
factors—succeeds in recuperating fault in a meaningful way on the individual 
level.  Finally, it was suggested that the entire project of consumer responsibility 
could be abandoned in exchange for a focus on the concept of charity.  However, 
the causal role of consumers in the creation of a collective harm by virtue of their 
consumer acts suggests that responsibility is an appropriate avenue to explore.  In 
the following pages, I will suggest that a search for a single conceptualization of 
consumer responsibility is problematic.  Rather, I will focus on ways of addressing 
the collective action problem that is at the heart of unstructured collective harms in 
the TCF industry.  Instead of conceptualizing consumer responsibility in a 
particular way, I will suggest that the goal should be to implement tools that help 
individuals to apprehend, or realize, their responsibility for distant economic harms 
on an individual level, and according to individual conceptualizations, thereby 
addressing the collective action problem that leads to the creation of unstructured 
collective harms in the first place.  I will suggest that, by providing an adequate 
moment where individuals can bring their moral reasoning to bear on their 
contributions to sweatshop harm, individual consumers will be more capable of 
conceptualizing their responsibility in accordance with a range of considerations 
including the unacceptability of the harm itself, their connection to the harm, a 
sense of fault derived from benefitting from another’s suffering, a sense of duty to 
avoid harming others and a duty to prevent others from being harmed, 
consequentialist reasoning, and the moral dissuasion of others.  This individual 
realization of responsibility can lead to more effective changes in behaviour.  A 
system of confrontation, most likely regulated by the state, can provide the type of 
stable moment that is required.   
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Another way of understanding the dialogue between Young’s Social 
Connection Model and Schiff’s criticisms regarding problems of acknowledgment 
is that individual agency, when participating in vast systems of cooperation, 
remains present but becomes “alienated” by the effects of collective action.  It can 
be difficult for individuals to discern their role in bringing about a collective harm 
because the primary methods we use to reason about our role in harms—such as 
models of individual moral reasoning that stress immediacy and direct 
connection—are undermined by the diffuse causal chain that connect individual 
acts to harms in distant factories, the mediation of institutions, and the distorting 
effect that aggregated collective action has on intentional action.57  There is, 
therefore, a certain latent quality to individual responsibililty for unstructured 
collective harms, when individuals reflect upon their role in the harm, that is 
caused by the dissonance between individual models of moral reasoning and 
unorganized collective action.   It can only be addressed by limiting the sense of 
alienation experienced by contributors.   
Addressing the alienation of contributors serves to realize the unstructured 
collective harm in an experiential sense, thus aiding in the motivation of solutions.  
By consistently confronting consumers at the point of purchase with information 
regarding the conditions under which the product they seek to purchase was made, 
individual alienation can be reduced and acknowledgment problems avoided.  
Consider a system of “social labelling” regulated by a western state that is home to 
a large number of relatively well-resourced consumers.  TCF goods within the state 
borders would carry a label which included not only the location where the product 
was manufactured but also a clear indication of whether the product was made 
under sweatshop conditions or not.58  Each consumer, when they are deciding 
                                                 
57 For an excellent account of the limitations of individual moral reasoning in a globalized world 
that has many of the features of the “alienation” that I refer to here, see Samuel Scheffler 
“Individual Responsibility in a Global Age”, Social Philosophy and Policy, 12, (1995), 219-236. 
58 Clearly, a problem arises here regarding the lack of regulation in sweatshops.  If sweatshops 
occur partly because of a lack of regulation, how could a vast certification program be mounted that 
reliably measures and reports the conditions under which each product was made?  One response 
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whether to purchase the product or not, would be confronted with the label.  The 
information on the label would help to lower the incidence of acknowledgment 
problems and contribute to a more informed process of moral reasoning.  Tools that 
utilize confrontation are already present in other industries and could inspire the 
system(s) used in the TCF industry.  For instance, tobacco products are adorned 
with labels and pictures that clearly define the harm caused by smoking.  In the 
Canadian food industry, all products have extensive labels including detailed 
nutritional information and the location where the product was produced.  
Confrontation is becoming a widely used tool in western societies to adequately 
inform consumers about the products they buy.   In the TCF industry, this kind of 
certification could provide consumers with consistent, reliable, and uniform 
information which they can use as the basis for their consumer choices.   If 
consumers are confronted at the point of purchase with information regarding the 
conditions of the workers who made the product, the sense of distance between the 
consumer and the harm is reduced.  The consumer is confronted with a clearer 
moral choice—whether to support or perpetuate sweatshop labour or whether to 
benefit from the suffering of others versus the potential to contribute to collective 
solutions by abstaining and\or switching to sweat-free goods.   Furthermore, using 
confrontation in this way provides a context where individuals can symbolically act 
in ways that contribute to collective solutions within the boundaries of a reasonable 
understanding of individual responsibility and action, in this case the point of 
purchase.  Consumer responsibility does not exceed a reasonable sphere of 
individual action when it is restricted in this way while conceptualizations based on 
shared responsibility or forward-looking accounts of responsibility are highly 
demanding on the individual and contain fewer resources for individuals to reason 
                                                                                                                                       
could be to certify negatively.  In other words, each product that has not been been reliably certified 
as “sweat-free” would bear a label to that effect, i.e, “not sweat-free”.  This is perhaps not as 
effective, from the perspective of confronting consumers, as a label that clearly indicates that the 
product was made in a sweatshop but such a label would still enable a more effective confrontation 
than no label at all.  A labelling system that operates on a “sweat-free” or not basis, although it falls 
prey to a “guilty until proven innocent” mode of thinking, could still provide important stimulation 
to the relevent actors to increase regulation.   
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about their particular role in the creation of sweatshops.    Arguing for a more 
extensive form of responsibility would exceed reasonable expectations on the 
individual and lead to conceptualizations of responsibility that are feasible on the 
psychological level.  
Within a confrontation scheme, the criteria used to guide reasoning about 
individual responsibility are more coherently applied.  According to Pettit's model 
of individual responsibility discussed in chapter one,  confrontation in this way 
strengthens the value-relevance criteria by bringing moral significance to the 
purchase of TCF goods.  Rather than following through with a seemingly benign 
purchasing act, the consumer is forced to reason about the moral significance of the 
purchase they are about to make because the information on the label clearly 
indicates that a moral dimension is present in the product.  Injecting purchases with 
a moral dimension is crucial for engaging the individual moral reasoning of 
individuals.  Consequently, an important moral ingredient is present that can aid in 
addressing the collective action problem that leads to consumer support for 
sweatshop labour, suggesting that compliance, in the form of avoidance of 
sweatshop products, could be increased.  If the information at the point of purchase 
is reliable and uniform, then the value-judgement criteria is strengthened as well.  
Consumers will have reliable information at their disposal to decide which course 
of action to take: whether to purchase the product and to contribute to sweatshop 
labour or whether to refuse the purchase in order to avoid such a contribution.  The 
consequences of each option are more easily discerned, thus making the purchase a 
more conscious moral act.  Personal accounts of responsibility are more coherent in 
this way because it is harder for individuals to excuse themselves on the basis that 
they did not know that they were acting in a harmful way.  The act of purchasing a 
sweatshop product will have been made consciously, with knowledge that the 
product was made under sweatshop conditions.  There is still room for 
acknowledgment problems in a confrontation scheme, especially in cases where 
products are labelled as non sweat-free as opposed to a label that clearly indicates 
that the product was made in a sweatshop, but the prevalence of acknowledgment 
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problems would probably be reduced.  For practical reasons, the state is best 
situated to provide reliable and uniform information on labels.  Inconsistent or  
variable labels regulated by a number of different institutions—i.e., NGOs or non-
profit organizations—could reduce consumer confidence in the information on the 
labels, thus increasing the potential for acknowledgment problems.  Reliable and 
uniform information provided by a trusted institution—the state—would be more 
effective.   In this scenario, the consumer is considered to have the control 
necessary, or the value-sensitivity, to make the choice between purchasing the 
product or not.  Although some consumers may not have the financial resources to 
change to sweat-free goods (especially in cases where the availability of sweat-free 
goods is limited or the price is much higher), those who do have the resources to 
decline the purchase of sweatshop goods or switch to sweat-free goods possess the 
control necessary to fully realize a sense of responsibility.  If consumers feel highly 
constrained, relative to the sacrifice required to change their purchasing habits, then 
a strong sense of responsibility will be undermined.  Some latitude should be given 
in cases where consumers are financially constrained.       
With the aforementioned criteria strengthened by the mechanism of 
confrontation, the experience of responsibility is also strengthened on the 
individual level.  In other words, the epistemic gaps that limit individual consumers 
from fully apprehending their ability to affect far-off workers in TCF factories are 
addressed and the latent aspect of individual responsibility for unstructured 
collective harms is realized.  Furthermore, an important characteristic of a 
confrontation scheme is the recuperation of a sense of fault which has the potential 
to engage individuals more meaningfully in solutions.  This sense of fault could be 
derived from a number of different considerations.  Because the harm involved in 
the sweatshop labour will be contrasted more starkly with the relative importance 
of the consumer good, consumers may gain a sense of fault based on the notion of 
benefitting from another’s misery and contributing to that misery.  By knowingly 
following through with the purchase of product labelled as “non sweat-free”, the 
consumer is more likely to feel as though they have benefitted—in the form of low 
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prices, for example—from the harmful conditions that the manufacturing workers 
have endured and consequently, that they have contributed to that suffering by 
making a conscious act in support of those work conditions.   Consequentialist 
reasoning might be adopted at this stage by the consumer in order to reason about 
the most ethical course of action.  For instance, when considering the consequences 
of buying a sweatshop good or not, an individual might weigh the personal 
sacrifice involved in foregoing the purchase against the potential that their purchase 
could contribute to harm.  Conversely, the consumer might weigh the sacrifice of 
changing to a sweat-free product versus the potential that their purchase of a sweat-
free product contributes to solutions.  If we apply the form of reasoning that Singer 
proposes with regards to donations to charity, the morally negligible sacrifice of 
purchasing a sweat-free product would appear to be outweighed by the potential 
that the purchase, when repeated, contributes to a diminution of sweatshops and an 
improvement in the lives of distant manufacturing workers.  Consequentialist 
reasoning of this kind, when adopted by consumers in the context of a 
confrontation scheme, could enable individual marginal acts to be directed in ways 
that lead to morally acceptable collective outcomes.   
If the label is structured in human rights language—specifically with 
reference to basic economic human rights—which I have argued is the most 
plausible system on which to conceptualize the harm, then fault is recuperated by 
the notion of transgressing a duty to avoid depriving others and not fulfilling a duty 
to protect others from deprivation.  Consequently, individual responsibility for the 
harm can be coherently understood on the same basis.  These types of duties, 
typically understood as a negative duty not to cause harm and a positive duty to 
prevent others from being harmed, is an effective way of motivating action because 
it implicates the individual in the act of violating the rights of others and it 
resonates with individual understandings of a duty to aid those in distress.  The 
negative\positive dichotomy has been effectively undermined by contemporary 
philosophers, but the notion of transgressing duties to to preserve human rights 
continues to resonate strongly within western, liberal societies and are therefore 
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particularly useful in terms of structuring coherent individual reasoning about 
responsibility for harm.   Henry Shue suggests that the fulfillment of a basic right, 
as well as most less basic rights, requires the performance, by individuals and 
institutions, of one or more the following kinds of correlative duties:  
I. To avoid depriving 
II. To protect from deprivation 
1. By enforcing duty (I) and 
2. By designing institutions that avoid the creation of strong 
incentives to violate duty (I). 
III. To aid the deprived 
1. Who are one’s special responsibility, 
2. Who are victims of social failures in the performance of duties 
(I), (II-1), (II-2) and 
3. Who are victims of natural disasters.59 
 
When a product labelled “non sweat-free” is purchased, the consumer 
knowingly contributes, however marginally, to the perpetuation of incentives that 
structure global systems of trade in ways that promote sweatshop labour.  
Furthermore, they are making a conscious act in support of these working 
conditions, thus helping to reproduce the social structures that will enable 
sweatshops in the future.   In this way, the consumer is participating in collective 
ventures that actively transgress the duty to avoid depriving others of their basic 
economic human rights.  In this way, a basis for coherently conceptualizing 
individual responsibility for sweatshop labour is retained.  While the action is not 
direct—i.e., the consumer is not physically harming a worker that is standing next 
to them, in the sense of a transgressing a negative duty not to harm others as it is 
commonly understood—the connection between the consumer act and the violation 
of the duty is made clearer for the consumer by the presence of the confrontation 
scheme.  When other, less harmful, options are available, it seems plausible that a 
sense of fault will be generated by consciously acting in ways that contribute, 
rather than prevent, harm.  Furthermore, the implication of the state in the 
                                                 
59 Henry Shue, Basic Rights: Subsistence, Affluence, and U.S Foreign Policy (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1980): 60. 
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implementation of a social labelling system can be understood as an extension of 
duties (I) and (II).  The use of government institutions to help inform and engage 
individual moral reasoning is an effective way to address the collective action 
problem that perpetuates consumer contributions to sweatshops.  Redirecting 
marginal consumer acts towards positive collective outcomes in the TCF industry 
helps to realign the incentives present in the industry, thus stimulating institutional 
and structural change.  Utilizing goverment institutions for this purpose is the most 
effective way to organize collective solutions and the utilization of institutions in 
this way is dictated by the structure of correlative duties.  
Moral reasoning that adopts a consequentialist approach or an approach 
based on correlative duties aids individual consumers in the construction of 
coherent character-based accounts for their actions understood in terms of the 
virtuous participation in collective ventures that lead to the prevention of 
sweatshop labour abroad.  These types of character-based accounts are essential, 
according to Kutz, for motivating and sustaining collective solutions to 
unstructured collective harms.  Also, if all consumers are confronted in similar 
ways, there is the potential for an “Assurance Scheme” to arise where the moral 
dissuasion of others acts as a sanction and promotes the compliance of individual 
consumers, understood in terms of the avoidance of sweatshop goods or the 
purchasing of sweat-free goods.  Each consumer becomes aware that others are 
similarly confronted and each consumer is aware that, if they purchase a product 
that is not labelled “sweat-free”, other consumers will be aware of their choice.  
Another element enters consumer reasoning that increases the chances of 
compliance: if they do not comply, they will be subject to the moral dissuasion of 
others.  This increases the chances that consumers will buy sweat-free products by 
increasing the sense, among consumers generally, that others will discharge their 
responsibility as well.  The presence of a labelling system regulated by government 
institutions lends credibility to this venture.   
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Ideally, changes in consumer purchasing trends that are brought about by 
confrontation schemes could stimulate larger markets for ethical products by 
creating incentives for MNCs to improve working conditions in the manufacturing 
centres where they sub-contract in order to meet consumer demand for certified 
goods.  Furthermore, the desire for foreign investment in domestic manufacturing 
centres may lead to political pressure to improve state regulation of sweatshops.  In 
this way, consumers could be effectively engaged in positive collective ventures to 
improve the working conditions of employees in manufacturing centres all over the 
world. 
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Conclusion 
Throughout this work, I have tried to theorize ways that western consumers 
can understand their responsibility for distant harm in sweatshops.   For pragmatic 
reasons, I have used a human rights framework to conceptualize the harm itself 
while arguing that a weak cosmopolitan thesis is required to extend the potential 
for suffering and our conceptions of responsibility beyond borders.  Furthermore, I 
have explored how economic connections, subsumed under the concept of social 
structure, are adequate for consumers to understand their connection to sweatshop 
harm and the ways that they contribute to it.  Responsibility, in turn, has been 
conceptualized within a context where individual consumers are confronted at the 
point of purchase by a system of social labelling that includes information 
regarding the nature of the conditions under which the desired product was made.  
Consumer responsibility, in this context, is conceptualized on an individual basis 
according to a number of considerations including notions of fault derived from 
benefitting from another’s suffering, correlative duties to avoid harming others and 
to prevent harm, and a consequentialist calculation of the moral worth of the 
purchase versus the harm to which such a purchase could contribute.  This provides 
a stable, appropriate moment for consumers to exercise their moral reasoning, 
complete with adequate information regarding the moral contours of the purchase, 
in order to decide whether they wish to support sweatshop labour with their 
purchasing power or not.  Furthermore, the confrontation mechanism helps to 
recuperate a sense of fault in the consumer.  This is useful for motivational reasons, 
while simultaneously acting as an assurance scheme that promotes the participation 
of individuals in collective endeavours that increase the likelihood that labour 
conditions will be improved in TCF factories overseas.  Consumers confronted in 
this way are more likely to be subject to moral dissuasion from others, increasing 
the likelihood that  sweatshop products will be avoided and sweat-free products 
69 
 
will be purchased, potentially stimulating more extensive certification efforts and 
creating more substantial sweat-free product lines to meet consumer demand.   
  Clearly, political obstacles remain that would hinder the adoption of a 
social labelling system designed to confront consumers in this way.  To begin, 
adequately addressing the kind of unstructured collective harm described here 
through the development and implementation of a social labelling system like the 
one I propose, requires the intervention of the state.  The information on the labels 
needs to be uniform, reliable, and clear, as well as applicable to all relevant goods.  
Currently, regulation of working conditions on sweatshop floors is lacking.  More 
particularly, unilateral certification by a state, whereby a product is labelled “non 
sweat-free” could easily be construed as a trade barrier.  Under current WTO rules, 
unilateral decisions to label goods in this way would most likely be condemned.  
Although a labelling system would not block non-certified goods from a domestic 
market per se, the certification of certain goods as sweat-free and others as made 
under sweatshop conditions clearly constitutes a disadvantage for the non-certified 
goods in the eyes of consumers.   Most high-income states are better positioned to 
provide certified goods produced in their manufacturing centres because of more 
extensive unionization and the existence of stronger regulatory agencies.  
Unilateral or multilateral action by a nation-state or nation-states to label TCF 
goods according to more stringent labour standards could be construed as a ploy to 
gain an advantage in the highly competitive TCF manufacturing industry.  Not 
surprisingly, it has often been low-income countries that have lobbied for the 
exception of labour standards from the rules and regulations of organizations like 
the WTO on the basis that more stringent global labour standards would unfairly 
advantage more developed nations.60   
Further complicating the case for a labelling system is the product versus 
process distinction made by the WTO which serves to limit trade barriers to 
                                                 
60 “Labour Standards: Consensus, Coherence, and Controversy” , World Trade Organization, 
accessed August 2, 2010,  http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/bey5_e.htm .   
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products that are of lower quality or of a significantly different type but not to 
products that are produced in different ways.  Products that are made with different 
processes—whether that be t-shirts made with sweatshop labour or fur procured 
with steel-claw leg traps for example—are not subject to trade barriers if the 
product itself remains intrinsically the same as competing products.  Therefore, two 
t-shirts that are virtually the same must be allowed into the same domestic markets 
regardless of whether one is “sweat-free” and the other was made in a sweatshop.  
The distinction between product vs. process appears to have been made expressly 
to prevent nation-states from erecting trade barriers under the guise of different 
processing methods, whether that includes human rights violations or not.61   
Finally, the cost of certification would likely be passed on to the consumer, 
resulting in lower prices on non-certified goods.  This is already the case with 
regards to the higher price of sweat-free goods.  In the eyes of low-income nations 
that have had their TCF products certified non sweat-free, the advantage of a lower 
selling price may be little consolation.  Conversely, consumers may resent the fact 
that they must bear the price for collective solutions that reduce the prevalence of 
sweatshops and this resentment may reduce the efficacy of confrontation schemes.  
However, regardless of these practical and political obstacles, what I have tried to 
do here is show that there is a legitimate theoretical basis for coherently 
understanding consumer responsibility for harms such as those that occur on 
sweatshop floors.   As a general account of solutions to unstructured collective 
harms,  the theory points to the need for tools that engage consumers on an 
individual basis—within a context whereby individual moral reasoning can be 
coherently engaged and responsibility discharged—in order in order to address 
collective action problems and to stimulate solutions.  Furthermore, exploring 
consumer responsibility in this way suggests that, as our connections intensify 
across borders, we will be required to develop more complete accounts of 
responsibility as members of a single, global community, rather than members of 
                                                 
61 Peter Singer,  One World  (London: Yale University Press, 2002), 60. 
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national communities.  After all, increasingly, the effects of our actions are not 
limited to the borders of our state and over a lifetime, the cumulative effects of our 
actions will have made a significant impact on distant others.  Accepting 
responsibility for the effects of our contributions to collective outcomes is an 
important step towards becoming a responsible global citizen.  Engaging our 
respective states in the implementation of systems that aid in the production of 
collective solutions can be one way to address the moral needs of our global 
community.     
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